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### Unification Advantage---1AC

#### Advantage one is unification.

#### China structurally favors unification, but the alliance causes a veto.

Huileng Tan 19. Reporter @ CNBC. “As Trump and Kim meet, one of Beijing's chief concerns is the US-South Korea alliance”. <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/27/trump-kim-summit-china-concerned-about-us-south-korea-alliance.html>

China supports the reunification of North and South Korea, but Beijing is deeply worried about Seoul's security alliance with the U.S., according to one analyst.

Although North and South Korea are still far away from any sort of reunification, both nations have said that remains an ultimate goal. Such a move is hardly on the table for this week's summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in the Vietnamese capital of Hanoi. Still, any draw down in tensions would be a step toward reunification.

China's opinion on North Korea's affairs is important because Beijing is the primary economic and political benefactor of Pyongyang.

"The Chinese have always argued that they actually support the reunification of the Korean Peninsula because when they look at their own case (of) the Taiwan Straits and the reunification that China is trying to achieve, to obstruct the reunification of the Korean Peninsula is almost morally unacceptable and is morally wrong for China to take that position," Yun Sun, director of the China program at Washington think tank the Stimson Center, said Wednesday.

"What the Chinese have always conveyed to the Americans and to the South Koreans is that 'we don't have problems with the reunification, but we have concerns about the future of the U.S.-South Korea alliance,'" Sun added.

Should some form of inter-Korean reunion eventually happen, the big concerns for China would be: "Does the alliance still exist? Will the U.S. have troops basically going north to the Chinese border?" Sun told CNBC.

Beijing will want answers from the U.S. and South Korea on that front, she added.

U.S. troops have been stationed in South Korea since the 1950s. There were more than 26,000 American military personnel in the country at the end of 2018, according to data from the U.S. Defense Department.

"Without an acceptable arrangement or a grand bargain, if you will, on that front, I don't think China will be particularly supportive of reunification," Sun said.

#### The plan enables planned unification---solves economic growth---all other paths create shocks.

Lee Jong-Wha 17. Professor of Economics and Director of the Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University. "Planning for Korean Reunification". ASEAN Post. https://theaseanpost.com/article/planning-korean-reunification

China could still be persuaded to take a more active role in constraining the Kim regime. Indeed, its uncooperativeness could damage its relationships with the US, Europe, Japan, and South Korea – all of which are ultimately more valuable partners than the unruly, impoverished North Korea.

But for China to do more, it needs assurances that it will not immediately lose its strategic buffer on the Korean Peninsula. Hence the need for an agreement now on how to handle the potential collapse of the Kim regime and the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Like the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Kim regime’s collapse could come about quite suddenly. So China needs to know now that a reunified Korea would not be its enemy, and that the US would withdraw its troops that are currently stationed in South Korea.

Of course, the implications of a collapsed regime in North Korea extend far beyond China’s strategic interests. Indeed, it would have a major economic and political impact throughout the region. That is all the more reason to put a comprehensive plan in place to ensure a peaceful transition.

I recently conducted a quantitative assessment of the economic impacts of unification on North and South Korea under several hypothetical scenarios, assuming North Korea’s sudden collapse. As it turns out, a peacefully managed unification process, characterized by comprehensive economic reform and opening-up, could enable North Korea to achieve sustained double-digit GDP growth, despite a sharp slowdown immediately following the collapse.

The key to success would be to allow North Korea to take advantage of its relatively abundant human and natural resources, including rich mineral reserves, to achieve export-led industrialization. As for South Korea, with sufficient preparation, effective policies, and more financial resources, it can manage a peaceful reunification and mitigate the adverse effects of the shock.

By contrast, in a scenario where South Korea is unprepared for reunification and the North quickly dissolves in a state of disorder, the risk premium on the Korean Peninsula would jump sharply, and reforms would be delayed. This would lead to persistently weakened investment and GDP growth across the Korean Peninsula, causing South Korea’s GDP to decline by more than 3% in the initial years of the crisis. Inflows of migrants from the North would compound the risks, potentially disrupting South Korean labor markets and causing social unrest.

For now, the international community, including China, should continue to push for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and pursue economic reforms, using ever-stronger economic sanctions. Meanwhile, South Korea must continue its efforts to resume a dialogue with the North on humanitarian, health, and environmental issues. Civilian exchanges and information flows could nurture forces that would bring about fundamental change from the inside.

Even after 70 years of division, South Koreans must not give up hope for peaceful reunification with our northern brethren. On the contrary, we must plan for it.

#### Unification is key to sustainability---solves Chinese capital investment, the Korean aging crises, global mineral shortages, and trade costs---reverberates globally.

Sue Mi Terry 14. Former analyst at the CIA and a Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University's Weatherhead East Asian Institute. “A Korea Whole and Free: Why Unifying the Peninsula Won't Be So Bad After All”. Foreign Affairs.

Even China would have reason to rejoice. It could replace its unrequited transfers of fuel, food, and other goods to Pyongyang with capital investments that yielded income. And once it stopped propping up the most despotic regime in the world, Beijing would find it far easier to portray itself as a responsible international stakeholder.

The end of the Kim regime would also have huge humanitarian benefits, freeing 25 million people from the grip of the world's last remaining Stalinist state and integrating them into a modern democ- racy. The majority of North Korea's 80,000 to 120,000 state prisoners could leave the government's slave-labor camps, where most have been consigned for political, rather than criminal, offenses. Average North Koreans could move from a starvation diet, both literally and intellectually, to the plentiful availability of food, information, consumer products, and all the other benefits of modern capitalism. South Koreans, an intensely nationalist people, would also finally get to celebrate the reunification of the Korean family. Korea would once again become a single state, as it was from the year 668, when the Silla dynasty unified the three Korean kingdoms, until 1945, when the Soviet Union and the United States divided it at the 38th parallel.

But the greatest benefits for the South would be economic. Reunification would be far more profitable than is commonly assumed. For starters, Seoul could sharply reduce its defense spending, which currently stands at $30 billion a year, or 2.5 percent of gdp-a figure that excludes the $1 billion it gives every year to Washington to help cover the costs of the U.S. military's presence on the peninsula. South Korea could end universal conscription and shrink its 680,000- man military to 500,000 personnel or fewer, freeing large numbers of young Korean men to enter the work force years earlier than they currently do. Also joining them would be the 1.1 million people, most of them young, that North Korea now employs in its military.

The prospect of extra young workers should be especially tantalizing given the rapid aging of South Korea's population. Thanks to the country's growing wealth, life expectancy in South Korea has reached 81 years and continues to improve, whereas its birthrate, at only 1.2 children per woman, is among the lowest in the world. As a result, according to projections by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, by 2050, South Korea will have the second-oldest population in the developed world, with nearly seven people over the age of 65 for every working-age adult. Absent reunification, the number of South Koreans aged 15 to 64 will start to decline in 2017; by 2030, so will the overall population.

In North Korea, by contrast, 91 percent of the population is currently younger than 65, and the fertility rate is higher than in the South, at 2.0 children per women. Following reunification, North Korea would add more than 17 million potential workers aged 15 to 64 to the nearly 36 million already in the South. South Korea could thereby avoid turning to Southeast Asia or other regions for low-wage workers, who would be hard to assimilate. South Korean firms could even move their factories from China to North Korea, where wages would be even lower initially.

Reunification would yield big gains in the mining sector. South Korea's high-tech economy is among the most advanced in the world, but the country possesses virtually no mineral wealth and must import 97 percent of its energy and mineral needs. North Korea, by contrast, has vast deposits of coal, uranium, magnesite, and rare- earth metals-together valued at $6 trillion-but it cannot currently access them. With technology from the South, however, this mother lode could be unlocked at last, providing a welcome boost to the global economy.

A reunified Korea would also boast a newly expanded domestic market, experience a spike in tourism revenues-since some of the most scenic parts of the peninsula lie in the North-and see its sovereign risk rating improve. As the risk of war finally disappeared, credit would become cheaper and foreign capital would flow more freely into the country.

Once the landmine-fortified demilitarized zone vanished, moreover, trade would get easier and cheaper. South Korea currently functions as an island economy, paying high transportation prices for raw materials. With the border gone, a long-envisioned gas pipeline from Vladivostok to Seoul could finally be built, sending badly needed Russian oil and gas south. Energy costs, which drag down the South Korean economy, would fall dramatically. Korean companies could also begin shipping goods to China and Russia over land.

Over time, a reunified Korea, with a hard-working population of 75 million, could emerge as a consumer and industrial powerhouse- the Germany of Asia. As two economies became one, abundant new investment opportunities would arise. According to a 2009 report by Goldman Sachs, within 30 to 40 years, the peninsula, if reunified, could overtake France, Germany, and even Japan in terms of gdp. South Korea's current trading partners-especially the biggest two, China and the United States-would benefit immensely from this newfound source of economic vitality.

#### Asia economic decline reverberates and causes war.

Michael Auslin 17. Williams-Griffis Fellow in Contemporary Asia at The Hoover Institution, Stanford; PhD. “The end of the Asian Century: War, stagnation, and the risks to the world’s most dynamic region.” American Enterprise Institute. January 10, 2017. <http://www.aei.org/publication/the-end-of-the-asian-century-war-stagnation-and-the-risks-to-the-worlds-most-dynamic-region/>

As this is being written, China’s economy has dramatically slowed, North Korea claims that it has a hydrogen bomb and is widely believed to be able to put nuclear weapons on top of ballistic missiles, Thailand’s military has launched its second coup in a decade, and Chinese newspapers warn that war with America is “inevitable” if Washington does not back down from opposing China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. These are just some of the more visible dangers that perturb the Indo-Paciﬁc. We are on the cusp of a change in the global zeitgeist, from celebrating a strong and growing Asia to worrying about a weak and dangerous Asia. For all its undeniable successes and strengths, the broader Indo-Paciﬁc region faces signiﬁcant, potentially insurmountable challenges.

The rest of us should worry because none of these problems threaten only Asia. Whether one cares about the Indo-Paciﬁc or not, it is half of our world. Today, one out of every three persons on earth is of Chinese or Indian descent, and the countries of the Indo-Paciﬁc account for nearly 60 percent of the world’s population. The World Bank estimates that the economies of Asia produce nearly 40 percent of total global output, and they are central to everything from weaving textiles to crafting the most advanced electronic technology. The militaries of Asia’s countries have grown dramatically, and China, India, and North Korea are nuclear powers. Democracies jostle with authoritarian states as neighbors in the world’s most dynamic region.

But the globalization that we continue to celebrate has its dark side as well. If an economic or security crisis erupted in Asia, it would reverberate around our increasingly interconnected world. Those risks are festering, some visible, others still hidden. The number one priority for the countries of the Asia-Paciﬁc, and the rest of the world, over the coming decade is managing and mitigating the risks that threaten the Asian Century.

To properly conceive of these trends, one must imagine a “risk map” of Asia. Unlike a traditional geographic map, this map is a conceptual tool for identifying the most important trends in the region and assessing their risk. This book maps out five discrete yet interrelated risk regions.

The first such region is the threat to Asia’s growth from the end of its economic miracle and the failure of reform. Thousands of headlines and dozens of books continue to proclaim the economic miracle as if it were destined to last forever. Yet dig beneath the headlines, and you find major problems, many of which national governments are failing to solve.

From Japan to India, the nations of Asia struggle to maintain growth, balance their economies, and fight slowdowns. For most of these countries, the days of high-flying growth are long over, while for others, they never began. It is past time for the rest of the world to pay attention to the threats to Asia’s economic health. Uneven development, asset bubbles, malinvestment, labor issues, and state control over markets are just some of the features of economic risk in the Asia-Pacific. And because Asian economies are increasingly interlinked, problems in one country spill over to others.

This region of Asia’s risk map, economic slowdown or collapse, directly concerns non-Asian nations. Global stock markets tanked in the summer of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 when China’s stock exchanges collapsed. Even if Asia’s economies manage to muddle through, the world must ask what will happen to global trade and investment if growth in Asia simply cools off. It is increasingly prudent to prepare for a far less economically energetic Asia than we are used to. And we must account for both long-term structural stagnation, as in Japan, and the style of house-of-cards capitalism currently practiced in China. There is little doubt that the world must prepare for a China whose growth has dramatically slowed if not stagnated, and for mature economies like Japan’s never to recapture their former vibrancy. As for the developing states, the risk is that they will never attain the growth needed to ensure the modernization of their societies.

#### Economic decline causes great power war.

Qian Liu 18. China-based economist. “From economic crisis to World War III.” Project Syndicate. 11-8-2018. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-crisis-military-conflict-or-structural-reform-by-qian-liu-2018-11>

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labour markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilise and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterised also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalisation, political polarisation, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald J. Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

#### Korean-based growth create reginal integration---solves Japan-China relations.

IFANS and KNDA 14. Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security & Korea National Diplomatic Academy. “Unified Korea as a Global Leader”.

The seventh largest economy in the world, with a population of 80 million

United Korea could become the seventh largest economy in the world, with a population of 80 million. This population size is about the average among current G7 members, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Also, an “open nation” policy will ensure the dynamicity of the demographic structure and contribute to the economy of scale, which will facilitate and catalyze the synergy of various factors contributing to economic prosperity.

According to a Goldman Sachs report, the GDP of a unified Korea will exceed that of France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and rise to around eighth place in the world rankings.4 Korea may fall behind Mexico, Indonesia, and Russia in terms of population by then. However, with the quality of its workforce, its active pursuit of global talent under its open country policy, the momentum gained from the East Asian economic community, its advanced information technology and other technologies, and its geopolitical advantage as a bridge linking Eurasia and Asia-Pacific, Korea could surpass its rivals and become the seventh largest economy in the world.

The unification itself has the potential to generate considerable synergy, raising the GNI per capita in North Korea to about USD 56,000, approximately 70 percent of the South’s. The transition of the Mongolian and Russian economies to the market system has shown that countries in this region possess the capacity for dramatic economic growth, so long as they secure adequate amounts of investment. Mongolia, in particular, has been growing at a rate of 10 to 15 percent since opening its market. The South Korean economy, which is ranked about 15th today in terms of GDP, could easily deteriorate and contract due to the nation’s aging population if Koreans fail to achieve national unification in the next three or four decades.

A new economic power riding on the momentum of unification

Unification will allow the Korean economy to make use of the comparative advantages of both the South and North, and also capitalize on all other effects of integration to transform into a major economic power. Defense spending, which accounts for about 2.6 percent of South Korea’s GDP today, will be decreased to about 2 percent, thus liberating funds that can be invested in other valuable services. Also, the contraction of the military will make at least a million more young men available to join the workforce. The influx of younger North Koreans into the aging South Korean society will also help raise the overall ratio of the working population from 55.5 percent to 59.8 percent.5

North Korea boasts various and abundant reservoirs of natural resources, including magnesite, graphite, gold, zinc, and iron ore. The development of these resources will enable Korean industries to procure at least 50 percent of their raw materials from the domestic market. The development and expansion of infrastructure in North Korea will also open up new opportunities for South Korean businesses. East Germany did not enjoy a dramatic increase in investment after German reunification, because investors flocked not only to East Germany but also to neighboring countries in Eastern Europe, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. North Korea, on the other hand, will be able to enjoy almost exclusive attention from foreign investors. Once South Korean capital and technology combines with North Korean resources and labor, and with increasing foreign investment, the Korean economy will completely transform itself, with the gains far exceeding the costs in the mid to long term.

Leading economic growth and prosperity in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific

Korean unification will also remove major obstacles that had previously prevented the two Koreas from expanding around the world, and will transform Korea into a major hub of prosperity and trade linking the continents and oceans of Eurasia and Asia-Pacific. A unified Korea will be connected to an intercontinental railroad and road networks extending into China and Russia, and also house new power and gas networks, thus supporting transportation, logistics, energy, and tourism in Northeast Asia.

The economic growth of a unified Korea will spread into the three northeastern provinces of China, the maritime province of Russia, and southward to other Pacific states, and will fuel increasing prosperity in Eurasia and Asia-Pacific. The three northeastern Chinese provinces, previously isolated from the rest of the world, will evolve into dynamic and open centers of trade. Connected to Russia’s maritime province and Japan, the newly opened regions will increase the size of our market by USD 300 to 350 million, while amplifying cultural and social exchange throughout the region as well.

Forming an East Asian economic community, the world’s largest economic bloc

A unified Korea will work more closely with China and Japan to create a regional economic bloc, which will become the world’s largest. The integration of the East Asian economies will present Korea with new opportunities for further growth, while also allowing Korea to better mitigate the rising China-Japan rivalry, balance Russia’s increasingly aggressive stance, and enhance cooperation and coordination among all the states in the region.

The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) predicts that, once free trade agreements are made among Korea, China, and Japan, and economic cooperation reaches a certain level, the East Asian bloc will become the most important and valuable economic bloc in the world in terms of GDP, surpassing its North American and European counterparts. The dynamic economy of a unified Korea will not only stimulate and support increasing prosperity in Eurasia, but also give birth to the East Asian economic community and reinforce economic cooperation in the Pacific region.

#### Japan-China war goes nuclear.

Brendan Taylor 18. Associate Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University. “The Four Flashpoints: How Asia Goes to War.” La Trobe University Press.

But the vulnerability of modern military technology could also have the perverse effect of making conflict in the East China Sea more likely. Scholars Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball argue that even a limited military clash between Japan and China could quickly escalate into full- blown, very possibly nuclear, war. The reason is simple. Modern militaries rely upon a sophisticated network of systems to track their opponent's movements. Underwater sensors, for instance, are used to detect enemy submarines. But these systems are highly vulnerable to attack and difficult to defend. Should a Sino-Japanese conflict occur, Beijing and Tokyo would face the temptation of escalating the shooting quickly to target their opponent's systems, rather than holding off and risking an attack against their own."

#### AND unification lets Korea lead global governance---solves existential threats from climate, cyber, and epidemics.

IFANS and KNDA 14. Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security & Korea National Diplomatic Academy. “Unified Korea as a Global Leader”.

Leading global governance

The march of globalization is deepening the political, economic, social, and cultural interdependence among nations and expediting regional integration. However, the world has yet to find an effective system of managing and resolving global issues. A unified Korea has a significant stake in solving the problems of globalization— e.g., alienation, frustration, social inequality, and poverty—and promoting prosperity and democracy worldwide. The international community as a whole needs to establish a more effective collective decision-making system in order to tackle the inhumane aspects of globalization. In other words, we all need a better system of global governance.

A unified Korea will join the ranks of G7 countries in terms of wealth, population, and soft power, and may set an example of new diplomacy, providing an effective bridge between advanced countries and developing ones. It will uphold universal values and norms, lead the global governance, and pursue corresponding foreign policies. It will also apply its increased diplomatic capacity to finding creative and effective solutions to various problems in global governance.

Once unified, Korea will play a much more significant role in the United Nations, which will be at the center of global governance. A unified Korea could play an active role in reforming the internal organizations and operations of the UN General Assembly and other affiliated bodies. A unified Korea will actively contribute to the UN’s objective of promoting peace and prosperity in the world. Based on its active participation in the UN and its programs, Korea may finally become the permanent member of the Security Council, developing the scope and quality of its diplomacy.

Having reinforced its participations in the UN and other international organizations, a unified Korea will naturally play a leading role in shaping global agenda. The international community will face a new host of global problems by the mid-21st century, including, but not limited to, new issues in climate change, natural disasters, nuclear security, maritime security, and terrorism, as well as the spread of international criminal networks, cybersecurity, and acute epidemics threatening the entire human race. These issues, both new and old, will require greater and more effective global cooperation. A unified Korea, therefore, will need to play a pivotal role in motivating and amplifying international cooperation to tackle these issues. Being free of the arms race and other security concerns caused by its national division and rivalry, a unified Korea will gain greater capacity to research and develop solutions for global problems. Based on this increased capacity, it will play a leading role in solving the diverse issues on the global agenda.

Promoting prosperity worldwide with the Korean model of development.

Having grown to achieve remarkable economic and social development from its previous abject poverty and ruin created by an internecine war, Korea will be in the unique position of providing inspiration and hope for a better future to countries afflicted with similar tragedies and problems. A unified Korea will form alliances with underdeveloped countries worldwide and support them with diverse development cooperation projects such as providing assistance for building an economic structure designed to eliminate poverty and foster sustainable development. In addition to providing bilateral assistance, Korea will also actively promote its model of development around the world, imparting its experiences and knowledge, for more effective international efforts. It will also promote cooperation and reconciliation programs that it successfully developed through its processes of democratization, peace-building, and unification.

Furthermore, as a new member of the G7, a unified Korea will help strengthen the liberal international economic system and play a major role in international efforts to maintain balanced and sustainable growth. In particular, it will help find new norms for mutual prosperity, striving to remedy the effects of the imbalance of power, concentration of wealth, vicious cycle of poverty, and the South-North problems. Especially, based on its own experiences of economic development and unification, a unified Korea will develop a creative and effective model of economic development that will contribute to solving economic inequality resulting from globalization and changes in industrial structure. A unified Korea, in other words, will help expand middle classes worldwide and make considerable contributions to the common good of the international community as a whole.

Peaceful non-nuclear state

Unification will bring about the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Its firm refusal to possess or deploy nuclear weapons on its territory will be a hallmark of a unified Korea’s foreign policy, as the country will make an endeavor for a nuclearfree world. A unified Korea will become a non-nuclear state that will not only strive to reduce conventional and nuclear weapons, but will also play an active role in preventing and resolving conflicts worldwide. It will also develop cutting-edge nuclear energy technology that is safe and without the risks of nuclear proliferation, and thus, will promote the use of green energy.

#### Unchecked climate change causes extinction.

Bill McKibben 19. Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College; fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; holds honorary degrees from 18 colleges and universities; Foreign Policy named him to their inaugural list of the world’s 100 most important global thinkers. "This Is How Human Extinction Could Play Out." Rolling Stone. 4-9-2019. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/bill-mckibben-falter-climate-change-817310/

Oh, it could get very bad.

In 2015, a study in the Journal of Mathematical Biology pointed out that if the world’s oceans kept warming, by 2100 they might become hot enough to “stop oxygen production by phyto-plankton by disrupting the process of photosynthesis.” Given that two-thirds of the Earth’s oxygen comes from phytoplankton, that would “likely result in the mass mortality of animals and humans.”

A year later, above the Arctic Circle, in Siberia, a heat wave thawed a reindeer carcass that had been trapped in the permafrost. The exposed body released anthrax into nearby water and soil, infecting two thousand reindeer grazing nearby, and they in turn infected some humans; a twelve-year-old boy died. As it turns out, permafrost is a “very good preserver of microbes and viruses, because it is cold, there is no oxygen, and it is dark” — scientists have managed to revive an eight-million-year-old bacterium they found beneath the surface of a glacier. Researchers believe there are fragments of the Spanish flu virus, smallpox, and bubonic plague buried in Siberia and Alaska.

Or consider this: as ice sheets melt, they take weight off land, and that can trigger earthquakes — seismic activity is already increasing in Greenland and Alaska. Meanwhile, the added weight of the new seawater starts to bend the Earth’s crust. “That will give you a massive increase in volcanic activity. It’ll activate faults to create earthquakes, submarine landslides, tsunamis, the whole lot,” explained the director of University College London’s Hazard Centre. Such a landslide happened in Scandinavia about eight thousand years ago, as the last Ice Age retreated and a Kentucky-size section of Norway’s continental shelf gave way, “plummeting down to the abyssal plain and creating a series of titanic waves that roared forth with a vengeance,” wiping all signs of life from coastal Norway to Greenland and “drowning the Wales-sized landmass that once connected Britain to the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany.” When the waves hit the Shetlands, they were sixty-five feet high.

There’s even this: if we keep raising carbon dioxide levels, we may not be able to think straight anymore. At a thousand parts per million (which is within the realm of possibility for 2100), human cognitive ability falls 21 percent. “The largest effects were seen for Crisis Response, Information Usage, and Strategy,” a Harvard study reported, which is too bad, as those skills are what we seem to need most.

I could, in other words, do my best to scare you silly. I’m not opposed on principle — changing something as fundamental as the composition of the atmosphere, and hence the heat balance of the planet, is certain to trigger all manner of horror, and we shouldn’t shy away from it. The dramatic uncertainty that lies ahead may be the most frightening development of all; the physical world is going from backdrop to foreground. (It’s like the contrast between politics in the old days, when you could forget about Washington for weeks at a time, and politics in the Trump era, when the president is always jumping out from behind a tree to yell at you.)

But let’s try to occupy ourselves with the most likely scenarios, because they are more than disturbing enough. Long before we get to tidal waves or smallpox, long before we choke to death or stop thinking clearly, we will need to concentrate on the most mundane and basic facts: everyone needs to eat every day, and an awful lot of us live near the ocean.

FOOD SUPPLY first. We’ve had an amazing run since the end of World War II, with crop yields growing fast enough to keep ahead of a fast-rising population. It’s come at great human cost — displaced peasant farmers fill many of the planet’s vast slums — but in terms of sheer volume, the Green Revolution’s fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery managed to push output sharply upward. That climb, however, now seems to be running into the brute facts of heat and drought. There are studies to demonstrate the dire effects of warming on coffee, cacao, chickpeas, and champagne, but it is cereals that we really need to worry about, given that they supply most of the planet’s calories: corn, wheat, and rice all evolved as crops in the climate of the last ten thousand years, and though plant breeders can change them, there are limits to those changes. You can move a person from Hanoi to Edmonton, and she might decide to open a Vietnamese restaurant. But if you move a rice plant, it will die.

A 2017 study in Australia, home to some of the world’s highest-tech farming, found that “wheat productivity has flatlined as a direct result of climate change.” After tripling between 1900 and 1990, wheat yields had stagnated since, as temperatures increased a degree and rainfall declined by nearly a third. “The chance of that just being variable climate without the underlying factor [of climate change] is less than one in a hundred billion,” the researchers said, and it meant that despite all the expensive new technology farmers kept introducing, “they have succeeded only in standing still, not in moving forward.” Assuming the same trends continued, yields would actually start to decline inside of two decades, they reported. In June 2018, researchers found that a two-degree Celsius rise in temperature — which, recall, is what the Paris accords are now aiming for — could cut U.S. corn yields by 18 percent. A four-degree increase — which is where our current trajectory will take us — would cut the crop almost in half. The United States is the world’s largest producer of corn, which in turn is the planet’s most widely grown crop.

Corn is vulnerable because even a week of high temperatures at the key moment can keep it from fertilizing. (“You only get one chance to pollinate a quadrillion kernels of corn,” the head of a commodity consulting firm explained.) But even the hardiest crops are susceptible. Sorghum, for instance, which is a staple for half a billion humans, is particularly hardy in dry conditions because it has big, fibrous roots that reach far down into the earth. Even it has limits, though, and they are being reached. Thirty years of data from the American Midwest show that heat waves affect the “vapor pressure deficit,” the difference between the water vapor in the sorghum leaf’s interior and that in the surrounding air. Hotter weather means the sorghum releases more moisture into the atmosphere. Warm the planet’s temperature by two degrees Celsius — which is, again, now the world’s goal — and sorghum yields drop 17 percent. Warm it five degrees Celsius (nine degrees Fahrenheit), and yields drop almost 60 percent.

It’s hard to imagine a topic duller than sorghum yields. It’s the precise opposite of clickbait. But people have to eat; in the human game, the single most important question is probably “What’s for dinner?” And when the answer is “Not much,” things deteriorate fast. In 2010 a severe heat wave hit Russia, and it wrecked the grain harvest, which led the Kremlin to ban exports. The global price of wheat spiked, and that helped trigger the Arab Spring — Egypt at the time was the largest wheat importer on the planet. That experience set academics and insurers to work gaming out what the next food shock might look like. In 2017 one team imagined a vigorous El Niño, with the attendant floods and droughts — for a season, in their scenario, corn and soy yields declined by 10 percent, and wheat and rice by 7 percent. The result was chaos: “quadrupled commodity prices, civil unrest, significant negative humanitarian consequences . . . Food riots break out in urban areas across the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America. The euro weakens and the main European stock markets lose ten percent.”

At about the same time, a team of British researchers released a study demonstrating that even if you can grow plenty of food, the transportation system that distributes it runs through just fourteen major choke-points, and those are vulnerable to — you guessed it — massive disruption from climate change. For instance, U.S. rivers and canals carry a third of the world’s corn and soy, and they’ve been frequently shut down or crimped by flooding and drought in recent years. Brazil accounts for 17 percent of the world’s grain exports, but heavy rainfall in 2017 stranded three thousand trucks. “It’s the glide path to a perfect storm,” said one of the report’s authors.

Five weeks after that, another report raised an even deeper question. What if you can figure out how to grow plenty of food, and you can figure out how to guarantee its distribution, but the food itself has lost much of its value? The paper, in the journal Environmental Research, said that rising carbon dioxide levels, by speeding plant growth, seem to have reduced the amount of protein in basic staple crops, a finding so startling that, for many years, agronomists had overlooked hints that it was happening. But it seems to be true: when researchers grow grain at the carbon dioxide levels we expect for later this century, they find that minerals such as calcium and iron drop by 8 percent, and protein by about the same amount. In the developing world, where people rely on plants for their protein, that means huge reductions in nutrition: India alone could lose 5 percent of the protein in its total diet, putting 53 million people at new risk for protein deficiency. The loss of zinc, essential for maternal and infant health, could endanger 138 million people around the world. In 2018, rice researchers found “significantly less protein” when they grew eighteen varieties of rice in high–carbon dioxide test plots. “The idea that food became less nutritious was a surprise,” said one researcher. “It’s not intuitive. But I think we should continue to expect surprises. We are completely altering the biophysical conditions that underpin our food system.” And not just ours. People don’t depend on goldenrod, for instance, but bees do. When scientists looked at samples of goldenrod in the Smithsonian that dated back to 1842, they found that the protein content of its pollen had “declined by a third since the industrial revolution — and the change closely tracks with the rise in carbon dioxide.”

Bees help crops, obviously, so that’s scary news. But in August 2018, a massive new study found something just as frightening: crop pests were thriving in the new heat. “It gets better and better for them,” said one University of Colorado researcher. Even if we hit the UN target of limiting temperature rise to two degrees Celsius, pests should cut wheat yields by 46 percent, corn by 31 percent, and rice by 19 percent. “Warmer temperatures accelerate the metabolism of insect pests like aphids and corn borers at a predictable rate,” the researchers found. “That makes them hungrier[,] and warmer temperatures also speed up their reproduction.” Even fossilized plants from fifty million years ago make the point: “Plant damage from insects correlated with rising and falling temperatures, reaching a maximum during the warmest periods.”

#### Cyberattacks go nuclear.

Michael T. Klare 19. Professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association. “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation.” https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation

Another initiative incorporated in the strategy document also aroused concern: the claim that an enemy cyberattack on U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) facilities would constitute a “non-nuclear strategic attack” of sufficient magnitude to justify the use of nuclear weapons in response.

Under the Obama administration’s NPR report, released in April 2010, the circumstances under which the United States would consider responding to non-nuclear attacks with nuclear weapons were said to be few. “The United States will continue to…reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks,” the report stated. Although little was said about what sort of non-nuclear attacks might be deemed severe enough to justify a nuclear response, cyberstrikes were not identified as one of these. The 2018 NPR report, however, portrayed a very different environment, one in which nuclear combat is seen as increasingly possible and in which non-nuclear strategic threats, especially in cyberspace, were viewed as sufficiently menacing to justify a nuclear response. Speaking of Russian technological progress, for example, the draft version of the Trump administration’s NPR report stated, “To…correct any Russian misperceptions of advantage, the president will have an expanding range of limited and graduated [nuclear] options to credibly deter Russian nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attacks, which could now include attacks against U.S. NC3, in space and cyberspace.”1

The notion that a cyberattack on U.S. digital systems, even those used for nuclear weapons, would constitute sufficient grounds to launch a nuclear attack was seen by many observers as a dangerous shift in policy, greatly increasing the risk of accidental or inadvertent nuclear escalation in a crisis. “The entire broadening of the landscape for nuclear deterrence is a very fundamental step in the wrong direction,” said former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz. “I think the idea of nuclear deterrence of cyberattacks, broadly, certainly does not make any sense.”2

Despite such admonitions, the Pentagon reaffirmed its views on the links between cyberattacks and nuclear weapons use when it released the final version of the NPR report in February 2018. The official text now states that the president must possess a spectrum of nuclear weapons with which to respond to “attacks against U.S. NC3,” and it identifies cyberattacks as one form of non-nuclear strategic warfare that could trigger a nuclear response.

That cyberwarfare had risen to this level of threat, the 2018 NPR report indicated, was a product of the enhanced cybercapabilities of potential adversaries and of the creeping obsolescence of many existing U.S. NC3 systems. To overcome these vulnerabilities, it called for substantial investment in an upgraded NC3 infrastructure. Not mentioned, however, were extensive U.S. efforts to employ cybertools to infiltrate and potentially incapacitate the NC3 systems of likely adversaries, including Russia, China, and North Korea.

For the past several years, the U.S. Department of Defense has been exploring how it could employ its own very robust cyberattack capabilities to compromise or destroy enemy missiles from such states as North Korea before they can be fired, a strategy sometimes called “left of launch.”3 Russia and China can assume, on this basis, that their own launch facilities are being probed for such vulnerabilities, presumably leading them to adopt escalatory policies such as those espoused in the 2018 NPR report. Wherever one looks, therefore, the links between cyberwar and nuclear war are growing.

The Nuclear-Cyber Connection

These links exist because the NC3 systems of the United States and other nuclear-armed states are heavily dependent on computers and other digital processors for virtually every aspect of their operation and because those systems are highly vulnerable to cyberattack. Every nuclear force is composed, most basically, of weapons, early-warning radars, launch facilities, and the top officials, usually presidents or prime ministers, empowered to initiate a nuclear exchange. Connecting them all, however, is an extended network of communications and data-processing systems, all reliant on cyberspace. Warning systems, ground- and space-based, must constantly watch for and analyze possible enemy missile launches. Data on actual threats must rapidly be communicated to decision-makers, who must then weigh possible responses and communicate chosen outcomes to launch facilities, which in turn must provide attack vectors to delivery systems. All of this involves operations in cyberspace, and it is in this domain that great power rivals seek vulnerabilities to exploit in a constant struggle for advantage.

The use of cyberspace to gain an advantage over adversaries takes many forms and is not always aimed at nuclear systems. China has been accused of engaging in widespread cyberespionage to steal technical secrets from U.S. firms for economic and military advantages. Russia has been accused, most extensively in the Robert Mueller report, of exploiting cyberspace to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Nonstate actors, including terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State group, have used the internet for recruiting combatants and spreading fear. Criminal groups, including some thought to be allied with state actors, such as North Korea, have used cyberspace to extort money from banks, municipalities, and individuals.4 Attacks such as these occupy most of the time and attention of civilian and military cybersecurity organizations that attempt to thwart such attacks. Yet for those who worry about strategic stability and the risks of nuclear escalation, it is the threat of cyberattacks on NC3 systems that provokes the greatest concern.

This concern stems from the fact that, despite the immense effort devoted to protecting NC3 systems from cyberattack, no enterprise that relies so extensively on computers and cyberspace can be made 100 percent invulnerable to attack. This is so because such systems employ many devices and operating systems of various origins and vintages, most incorporating numerous software updates and “patches” over time, offering multiple vectors for attack. Electronic components can also be modified by hostile actors during production, transit, or insertion; and the whole system itself is dependent to a considerable degree on the electrical grid, which itself is vulnerable to cyberattack and is far less protected. Experienced “cyberwarriors” of every major power have been working for years to probe for weaknesses in these systems and in many cases have devised cyberweapons, typically, malicious software (malware) and computer viruses, to exploit those weaknesses for military advantage.5

Although activity in cyberspace is much more difficult to detect and track than conventional military operations, enough information has become public to indicate that the major nuclear powers, notably China, Russia, and the United States, along with such secondary powers as Iran and North Korea, have established extensive cyberwarfare capabilities and engage in offensive cyberoperations on a regular basis, often aimed at critical military infrastructure. “Cyberspace is a contested environment where we are in constant contact with adversaries,” General Paul M. Nakasone, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command (Cybercom), told the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2019. “We see near-peer competitors [China and Russia] conducting sustained campaigns below the level of armed conflict to erode American strength and gain strategic advantage.”

Although eager to speak of adversary threats to U.S. interests, Nakasone was noticeably but not surprisingly reluctant to say much about U.S. offensive operations in cyberspace. He acknowledged, however, that Cybercom took such action to disrupt possible Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections. “We created a persistent presence in cyberspace to monitor adversary actions and crafted tools and tactics to frustrate their efforts,” he testified in February. According to press accounts, this included a cyberattack aimed at paralyzing the Internet Research Agency, a “troll farm” in St. Petersburg said to have been deeply involved in generating disruptive propaganda during the 2016 presidential elections.6

Other press investigations have disclosed two other offensive operations undertaken by the United States. One called “Olympic Games” was intended to disrupt Iran’s drive to increase its uranium-enrichment capacity by sabotaging the centrifuges used in the process by infecting them with the so-called Stuxnet virus. Another left of launch effort was intended to cause malfunctions in North Korean missile tests.7 Although not aimed at either of the U.S. principal nuclear adversaries, those two attacks demonstrated a willingness and capacity to conduct cyberattacks on the nuclear infrastructure of other states.

Efforts by strategic rivals of the United States to infiltrate and eventually degrade U.S. nuclear infrastructure are far less documented but thought to be no less prevalent. Russia, for example, is believed to have planted malware in the U.S. electrical utility grid, possibly with the intent of cutting off the flow of electricity to critical NC3 facilities in the event of a major crisis.8 Indeed, every major power, including the United States, is believed to have crafted cyberweapons aimed at critical NC3 components and to have implanted malware in enemy systems for potential use in some future confrontation.

Pathways to Escalation

Knowing that the NC3 systems of the major powers are constantly being probed for weaknesses and probably infested with malware designed to be activated in a crisis, what does this say about the risks of escalation from a nonkinetic battle, that is, one fought without traditional weaponry, to a kinetic one, at first using conventional weapons and then, potentially, nuclear ones? None of this can be predicted in advance, but those analysts who have studied the subject worry about the emergence of dangerous new pathways for escalation. Indeed, several such scenarios have been identified.9

The first and possibly most dangerous path to escalation would arise from the early use of cyberweapons in a great power crisis to paralyze the vital command, control, and communications capabilities of an adversary, many of which serve nuclear and conventional forces. In the “fog of war” that would naturally ensue from such an encounter, the recipient of such an attack might fear more punishing follow-up kinetic attacks, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons, and, fearing the loss of its own arsenal, launch its weapons immediately. This might occur, for example, in a confrontation between NATO and Russian forces in east and central Europe or between U.S. and Chinese forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Speaking of a possible confrontation in Europe, for example, James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine wrote that “both sides would have overwhelming incentives to go early with offensive cyber and counter-space capabilities to negate the other side’s military capabilities or advantages.” If these early attacks succeeded, “it could result in huge military and coercive advantage for the attacker.” This might induce the recipient of such attacks to back down, affording its rival a major victory at very low cost. Alternatively, however, the recipient might view the attacks on its critical command, control, and communications infrastructure as the prelude to a full-scale attack aimed at neutralizing its nuclear capabilities and choose to strike first. “It is worth considering,” Miller and Fontaine concluded, “how even a very limited attack or incident could set both sides on a slippery slope to rapid escalation.”10

What makes the insertion of latent malware in an adversary’s NC3 systems so dangerous is that it may not even need to be activated to increase the risk of nuclear escalation. If a nuclear-armed state comes to believe that its critical systems are infested with enemy malware, its leaders might not trust the information provided by its early-warning systems in a crisis and might misconstrue the nature of an enemy attack, leading them to overreact and possibly launch their nuclear weapons out of fear they are at risk of a preemptive strike.

“The uncertainty caused by the unique character of a cyber threat could jeopardize the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and undermine strategic stability in ways that advances in nuclear and conventional weapons do not,” Page O. Stoutland and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer wrote in 2018 paper for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “[T]he introduction of a flaw or malicious code into nuclear weapons through the supply chain that compromises the effectiveness of those weapons could lead to a lack of confidence in the nuclear deterrent,” undermining strategic stability.11 Without confidence in the reliability of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, a nuclear-armed state may misinterpret confusing signals from its early-warning systems and, fearing the worst, launch its own nuclear weapons rather than lose them to an enemy’s first strike. This makes the scenario proffered in the 2018 NPR report, of a nuclear response to an enemy cyberattack, that much more alarming.

#### Disease cause extinction.

Dennis Pamlin & Stuart Armstrong 15. \*Executive Project Manager Global Risks, Global Challenges Foundation. \*\*James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford. February 2015, “Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization: The case for a new risk category,” Global Challenges Foundation, p.30-93. https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf

A pandemic (from Greek πᾶν, pan, “all”, and δῆμος demos, “people”) is an epidemic of infectious disease that has spread through human populations across a large region; for instance several continents, or even worldwide. Here only worldwide events are included. A widespread endemic disease that is stable in terms of how many people become sick from it is not a pandemic. 260 84 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 3.1 Current risks 3.1.4.1 Expected impact disaggregation 3.1.4.2 Probability Influenza subtypes266 Infectious diseases have been one of the greatest causes of mortality in history. Unlike many other global challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good data exist. Plotting historic epidemic fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to follow a power law with a small exponent: many plagues have been found to follow a power law with exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are heavy-tailed262 to a significant degree.263 In consequence most of the fatalities are accounted for by the top few events.264 If this law holds for future pandemics as well,265 then the majority of people who will die from epidemics will likely die from the single largest pandemic. Most epidemic fatalities follow a power law, with some extreme events – such as the Black Death and Spanish Flu – being even more deadly.267 There are other grounds for suspecting that such a highimpact epidemic will have a greater probability than usually assumed. All the features of an extremely devastating disease already exist in nature: essentially incurable (Ebola268), nearly always fatal (rabies269), extremely infectious (common cold270), and long incubation periods (HIV271). If a pathogen were to emerge that somehow combined these features (and influenza has demonstrated antigenic shift, the ability to combine features from different viruses272), its death toll would be extreme. Many relevant features of the world have changed considerably, making past comparisons problematic. The modern world has better sanitation and medical research, as well as national and supra-national institutions dedicated to combating diseases. Private insurers are also interested in modelling pandemic risks.273 Set against this is the fact that modern transport and dense human population allow infections to spread much more rapidly274, and there is the potential for urban slums to serve as breeding grounds for disease.275 Unlike events such as nuclear wars, pandemics would not damage the world’s infrastructure, and initial survivors would likely be resistant to the infection. And there would probably be survivors, if only in isolated locations. Hence the risk of a civilisation collapse would come from the ripple effect of the fatalities and the policy responses. These would include political and agricultural disruption as well as economic dislocation and damage to the world’s trade network (including the food trade). Extinction risk is only possible if the aftermath of the epidemic fragments and diminishes human society to the extent that recovery becomes impossible277 before humanity succumbs to other risks (such as climate change or further pandemics). Five important factors in estimating the probabilities and impacts of the challenge: 1. What the true probability distribution for pandemics is, especially at the tail. 2. The capacity of modern international health systems to deal with an extreme pandemic. 3. How fast medical research can proceed in an emergency. 4. How mobility of goods and people, as well as population density, will affect pandemic transmission. 5. Whether humans can develop novel and effective anti-pandemic solutions.

#### Only unification solves conflict.

Andrew Yeo 20. Associate Professor of Politics at The Catholic University of America and a Fulbright Visiting Research Fellow at the University of the Philippines Diliman. “Only Korean Unification Can End the Korean War For Good” National Interest. 06-30-20. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/only-korean-unification-can-end-korean-war-good-163787>

The Korean War is seared into the national psyche of the two Koreas. Although both Koreas have rebuilt and moved forward, albeit on vastly different scales, the scars, symbolized by the demilitarized zone dividing the two Koreas, still remain. Seventy years later, **conflict persists between the two Koreas**, even if not at the level of full-scale war. North Korea’s recent acts of belligerence towards South Korea, including its recent destruction of the Inter-Korean Liaison Office in Kaesong, *underscore this* point. It was just two years ago that the end of the Korean War felt near. The Panmunjom Declaration adopted by Chairman Kim Jong-un and President Moon Jae-in on April 27, 2018, appeared to herald a new era of inter-Korean cooperation. Section 3 of the Declaration stated that “The two sides agreed to declare the end of war this year that marks the 65th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement.” Both Koreas stated their desire to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement and establish a permanent peace regime. As U.S.-North Korea diplomacy ramped up towards the June 2018 Singapore Summit, several policymakers, peace activists, and academics also pushed ending the Korean War onto the negotiating agenda. Proposals ranging from a non-binding end of war declaration to a formal peace treaty were advanced and scrutinized. An end-of-war declaration **may boost confidence-building and a peace treaty may officially end the Korean War**, however, even if a peace treaty were to formally end the war by 2025, **there could be no true end to the war without unification**. A treaty could not guarantee the end of future conflict between the two Koreas without other peace mechanisms also being in place—this includes a process of denuclearization. Of course, an end-of-war declaration or peace treaty might serve as an intermediate if not necessary step to building a lasting peace regime and eventual unification. One might argue that Korea was already divided prior to the start of the Korean War and that therefore the terms on which the Korean War ends need not account for unification. However, we must remember that the war itself was initiated to unify a divided Korea and rectify a situation conceived out of prior wars. North Korea struck first, but **South Korea was also fully prepared to unify the country** by force in 1950. For this reason, full and true closure to the Korean War **cannot take place without unification**—a task which at this moment seems unattainable by the 75th anniversary of the Korean War. Until then, June 25 will continue to be commemorated by Koreans as a day of national tragedy.

### Collapse Advantage---1AC

#### Advantage two is collapse.

#### The regime is collapsing---faced with a myriad of crises, a focus on nuclear weapon cleanup is essential.

George Hutchinson 21. Posted by Committee for Human Rights in North Korea “A Message to the Incoming Biden Administration – Pay Attention to North Korea” HRNK Insider. https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/01/a-message-to-incoming-biden.html

There are numerous potential exogenous and **endogenous causes that would create instability** and the Kim **regime is highly vulnerable** to all of them. These range widely, from a premature exit by Kim Jong-un—natural or unnatural, to coups, uprisings, or simply the **regime’s inability to continue coping** with international pressure against the **backdrop of myriad other ongoing crises**. Also included are scenarios like widescale **natural disasters** or accidents that do not begin as direct challenges to the Kim’s party leadership, but simply **shake the regime due to their staggering implications.** A Chernobyl-scale environmental or safety-related event could create chaos and confusion at levels that rupture regime stability. Should the regime unsuccessfully withstand these shocks to its ruling structure, countless unsettling scenarios could unfold.[9] The Hazards of the Korean People’s Army without Clear Command and Control Any scenario involving breakdown of the Kim regime creates grave concerns over the disposition and employment, intentional or inadvertent, of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and **its highly destructive weapons**, not to mention North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, which of course include a **portfolio of nuclear warheads.** The scenarios are further complicated by the numerous variables involved: China’s potential intervention; U.S. involvement vis-à-vis OPCON considerations, existing contingency plans, and the U.S.-ROK military alliance; South Korea’s political approach; involvement by the UN and NGOs; refugees and other humanitarian considerations; and the potential formation of factional groups, each competing to fill the vacuum of power. This list of notional factors represents just some of the variables within the full range of possibilities. Adding even more complexity to concerns over the disposition and employment of KPA forces is the vertical rigidity of North Korea’s command and control system. As a means to control the KPA, information is rarely allowed to flow horizontally. Information generated at the bottom of the command chain flows up vertically and orders flow back down the chain. Little, if any, communication is shared among adjacent KPA units.[10] In a scenario where the regime is destabilized, KPA units, with no command and control node in place to issue orders, may have no other choice than to default to pre-built checklists and execute pre-assigned tasks with no regard to, and no understanding of, the real-world events going on around them. Cut off from information, these units could operate in a highly suboptimal way, thinking they are going about business as per a pre-approved plan. The high stakes involved over the disposition and employment of the KPA along with the added complexity of numerous interacting variables not only puts primacy on maintaining contingency plans that are well-coordinated and up to date, but it also **places prioritization on understanding potential communication pathways capable of reaching KPA military forces in the event of a regime breakdown**. This will be vital in order to provide lines of emergency communication outside of broken-down regime control channels to prevent the unnecessary employment of weaponry or force, prepare for complex humanitarian operations intended to provide assistance, and if needed, sustain internal defensive operations. Campaigns of information dissemination must be designed to inform KPA forces, down to the soldier level, of the real-world situation occurring outside North Korea, imminent or ongoing human rights violations targeting them, and humanitarian help that is on its way to tend to them. To achieve these vital activities, it is essential that comprehensive interagency planning and coordination occur early in the new administration, **rather than waiting for a crisis to occur.**

#### North Korean collapse and loose nukes coming now---COVID wrecks the economy beyond repair.

Victor Cha 21. Senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a professor at Georgetown University and author of “The Impossible State: North Korea.” 01-15-21. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/15/why-north-korea-could-become-one-bidens-biggest-challenges/>

President Biden and his team will have a plethora of urgent issues to address upon taking office, above all the pandemic, economic recovery and race relations. Yet chances are good that, just as in past presidential transitions, North Korea will find a way to put itself on the front burner. In the past, the Kim regime drew attention to itself with provocations involving missiles and nuclear tests, and that could be the case in 2021 as well. Yet Biden and his team should be on their guard against another form of **North Korea crisis** — one involving a catastrophic **mix of covid-19, nuclear weapons and a collapsing economy.** North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s speech at the Workers’ Party Congress earlier this month made pretty clear that denuclearization is not in the cards for the Biden administration. On the contrary, Kim laid out a pretty ambitious agenda for weapons modernization including hypersonic missiles, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, nuclear-powered submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons. Kim also said he wants to develop ICBMs with precision targeting up to nearly 10,000 miles, which would more than cover the continental United States. And if Kim gets to work early, Biden could soon find himself confronting missile provocations — just as he did as vice president, when North Korea launched a rocket and exploded a nuclear device soon after President Barack Obama took office. But there’s a difference this time. Kim has **issued this latest round of threats** amid a raging global pandemic that has **shut down the country** and crippled an already weak economy. This could become the real source of crisis. Kim should fear U.S. military power far less than the prospect of a pandemic raging across a virtually nonexistent public health infrastructure. While North Korea still claims there are no covid-19 cases in the country, it has completely **locked down its borders**, not unlike the lockdowns it imposed in response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 and SARS in 2003. The economy has suffered dearly as a result, registering an economic downturn in 2020 comparable to the Great Famine in the 1990s, when 10 percent of the population perished. Normally, China and South Korea would help out, but the North Koreans have closed off almost all border trade for fear of the virus entering the country. Year-on-year trade with China, far and away the North’s leading trade partner, is down more than 70 percent. Indeed, when a disturbed South Korean government official tried to defect to the North last year, the North Korean military not only shot him but also burned the body to avoid any virus transmission. **Vaccines are a long way off**. South Korea, the most likely source, does not have them yet and isn’t likely to get any earlier than April. China has its own problems with the new virus variant, and its vaccine diplomacy is focused on Africa and Latin America. All this means **there is no end in sight.** Our independent study found that in response to the MERS virus in 2015, North Korea stayed locked down for twice the amount of time as South Korea, where the outbreak happened. Can the North Korean **economy really survive** being shut down for another year or longer? I don’t think so. North Korea may respond to this predicament by trying to take control of the burgeoning private markets inside of the country. The recent party congress suggests that such measures might include forcing hard-working North Korean citizens to hand over precious dollars, renminbi and euros gotten through black markets in return for worthless North Korean won. Our research interviewing North Korean defectors suggests that most social resistance against the iron hand of the state has taken place whenever the government has attempted anti-market activities such as currency reform, extraordinary taxes or market shutdowns. Should the regime become desperate enough to undertake such measures, it could find itself **confronting congregations of angry North Koreans** that could in turn become covid-19 superspreader events, compounding the crisis. A breakdown of such order could mean that the government in Pyongyang may be tempted to lash out militarily at external enemies to justify consolidating control at home through brutal crackdowns. In the worst case, the combination of disease and a deteriorating economy could lead to internal chaos that might **endanger government control over its nuclear arsenal.** A loose-nukes crisis could end up making a few missile launches look tame. All these variables mean that the new U.S. administration could face a **North Korean crisis unlike any confronting the United States before**. Biden would be well-advised to keep a close watch.

#### Coordination prevents stabilizes the peninsula, prevents loose nukes, and solves US-China war.

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The uncertain progress of U.S.–North Korean negotiations and disturbing signs of activity from North Korea’s nuclear complex suggest that Pyongyang has no plans to give up its nuclear arsenal. Even if the United States and North Korea agree to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, North Korea may surreptitiously violate the agreement or renege on its commitments. The United States may contemplate military force to disarm North Korea or to take control [End Page 85] of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal if the Kim regime collapses or the Korean Peninsula otherwise plunges into chaos. In any of these scenarios, China is likely to play a critical role. As a neighbor of North Korea, China has the most at stake and the greatest capability to intervene. This article considers what China might do in various scenarios involving conflict, chaos, and nuclear weapons in North Korea and how the United States and China might act to further their shared interests.

North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery systems has been a thorn in the side of U.S.-China relations for more than two decades. U.S. policymakers and experts agree—halting North Korea’s nuclear and missile program is the top priority for the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.7 Secretary of Defense James Mattis affirmed in June 2017 the United States and China’s “strong commitment to cooperate . . . to realize our shared goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” adding that “China’s end state on the Korean Peninsula in terms of nuclear weapons is the same as ours.”8 After another DPRK nuclear missile test in September 2017, President Trump also noted that Pyongyang “continue[s] to be very hostile and dangerous to the United States . . . and a great threat . . . to China, which is trying to help but with little success.”9

Although the United States seeks to work with China diplomatically on the North Korea nuclear issue, Washington does not coordinate with Beijing in preparing for contingencies involving the end of the North Korean regime.10 If the Kim regime collapsed or if a war broke out on the peninsula, the United States would support its South Korean ally in conducting stability operations, [End Page 86] defeat any remaining military resistance, and eliminate North Korea’s conventional and nuclear weapons.11 Of all these missions, the U.S. government considers securing and destroying North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated facilities “the most critical U.S. task.”12 Pyongyang’s November 2017 test of an intercontinental ballistic missile that potentially could strike major U.S. cities, including Los Angeles and Chicago, only raises the importance of controlling, defeating, disabling, and disposing of weapons of mass destruction with respect to other potential combat missions.

This mission is currently referred to as WMD-C3D (WMD control, defeat, disable, and dispose)—an update in terminology to the previous mission of WMD-Elimination (WMD-E), which refers to a set of military operations designed “to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a state or nonstate actor’s WMD programs and related capabilities in hostile and uncertain environments.”13 The WMD-C3D mission includes preventing the looting or capture of WMD and related materials, as well as rendering safe or destroying weapons, materials, agents, their means of production, and related delivery systems. This mission supports the broader counter-WMD strategy of seeking to ensure that “no new actors obtain WMD, those possessing WMD do not use them, and if actors use WMD, their effects are minimized.”14

One issue, however, has not been addressed adequately in the scholarly or policy literature: how China could affect the ability of the United States to secure and eventually eliminate North Korean nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities in a contingency.15 Would China be likely to intervene if war broke [End Page 87] out on the peninsula, and, if it did, how would it deal with North Korea’s nuclear program? Even if China were willing to conduct its own WMD-C3D mission on the peninsula, does the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have the capabilities to do so?16

Given the heightened risks, an in-depth understanding of China’s intentions and capabilities with respect to each step of this mission is necessary and timely. A prominent public intellectual, Jia Qingguo, argued that China must be prepared to discuss contingency plans with the United States and South Korea, and that the issue at the top of Beijing’s list should be who would control North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal.17 Noting that this responsibility would be costly, Jia nevertheless argues that, “on balance, China may wish to take care of the nuclear weapons itself,” because “China may have a problem with the U.S. military crossing the 38th parallel, reviving memories of the Korean War in the early 1950s.”18

To evaluate China’s intentions and capabilities regarding a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, I relied on a variety of sources. First, I conducted a critical reading of Chinese authoritative writings. The topic of North Korea, particularly its possible collapse, is politically sensitive in China, so government officials and scholars are extremely cautious when addressing this topic. As a result, relevant material is limited, but highly accurate—Chinese publications would not risk spreading ideas that challenge the Party line. Second, I interviewed [End Page 88] two dozen scholars, think tank researchers, scientists, and military officials in China and discussed the issue with experts at a nuclear workshop and a Track 1.5 meeting on nuclear issues (both in Beijing). Third, this article is informed by a series of workshops, meetings, and conversations with the individuals most closely involved with the WMD-C3D mission at Special Operations Command Pacific, U.S. Forces Korea, the Pentagon, the National Ground Intelligence Center, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, and the National Defense University.19

I argue not only that Chinese intervention in a Korea contingency is likely, but that Chinese troops on the peninsula would be beneficial, on aggregate, for U.S. interests and regional security. Given its geographic, logistical, and force posture advantages, China would likely reach North Korea’s nuclear facilities first. China would be intervening not to support the North Korean regime, but rather to achieve its own strategic objectives—one of which is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons or a nuclear accident on the peninsula. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the Chinese would mean that the North Koreans could not use them, an obvious plus.20 China also has the conventional capabilities, particularly the manpower, to secure all of North Korea’s nuclear sites, which would allow the United States to focus its more limited manpower on warfighting.21

Conceding part of the WMD-C3D mission to China would not be without drawbacks. China’s nuclear weapons dismantlement and nonproliferation capabilities have certain limitations. Cooperation with the United States and the international community, however, could help to mitigate them, an option that my Chinese interlocutors have stated that Beijing might consider. The biggest trade-off would come after the conflict, when China would seek to use the leverage it gained in controlling North Korean territory and nuclear facilities to ensure that the terms of reunification were more favorable to Beijing than to Washington. But given the limited ability of the United States to conduct a WMD-C3D mission in North Korea or to deter Chinese involvement there, coupled with the risk of war with China if it tried, the operational benefits to the United States would outweigh the strategic costs. [End Page 89]

#### China is key to secure nukes---capabilities and timing---the alternative is nuclear Korean war.

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In contrast to the above conventional wisdom, I argue that Chinese military involvement in a Korea contingency would benefit U.S. WMD-C3D objectives at almost every stage of the mission. For example, the United States’ plan is to first attempt to identify, isolate, and secure key sites, including nuclear research, production, storage, and delivery facilities; search and clear them of WMD; and do so possibly while sustaining major war operations.115 Studies show that the large number of WMD sites in North Korea would require massive combat forces to support the WMD-C3D mission, around 188,000 troops, though estimates vary greatly, depending on whether U.S. troops faced a hostile environment.116 With only 28,500 U.S. troops currently in South Korea, the U.S. military would have to fly in troops from the United States and Japan over several months. If resistance were light, the United States could drop airborne forces into the most worrisome sites, but it would take weeks for ground forces to flow in through the ports and across the border from South Korea.117 The mission would also take troops away from broader combat and stabilization operations for unspecified periods of time.118 Granted, under the United Nations Command, military personnel from South Korea and from the sending states would contribute greatly to the overall campaign. But given Nonproliferation Treaty limitations, South Korean troops could not take responsibility for the WMD-C3D mission. China, however, has both the authority to deal with nuclear materials (as a recognized nuclear state in the Treaty) and the necessary manpower, and it could take on this mission while freeing up U.S. troops to focus on warfighting and stabilization efforts. Moreover, because [End Page 111] Chinese forces have the geographic and logistical advantage, they would likely reach these facilities sooner. Nuclear weapons in the hands of China would mean that North Korea could not detonate them, thereby avoiding a nuclear war.

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction.

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The escalating threats between North Korea and the United States make it easy to forget the “nuclear nightmare,” as former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry put it, that could result even from the use of just a single terrorist nuclear bomb in the heart of a major city. At the risk of repeating the vast literature on the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the substantial literature surrounding nuclear tests and simulations since then—we attempt to spell out here the likely consequences of the explosion of a single terrorist nuclear bomb on a major city, and its subsequent ripple effects on the rest of the planet. Depending on where and when it was detonated, the blast, fire, initial radiation, and long-term radioactive fallout from such a bomb could leave the heart of a major city a smoldering radioactive ruin, killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people and wounding hundreds of thousands more. Vast areas would have to be evacuated and might be uninhabitable for years. Economic, political, and social aftershocks would ripple throughout the world. A single terrorist nuclear bomb would change history. The country attacked—and the world—would never be the same. The idea of terrorists accomplishing such a thing is, unfortunately, not out of the question; it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable nuclear explosive that might fit in the back of a truck than it is to make a safe, reliable weapon of known yield that can be delivered by missile or combat aircraft. Numerous government studies have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude bomb if they got the needed nuclear material. And in the last quarter century, there have been some 20 seizures of stolen, weapons-usable nuclear material, and at least two terrorist groups have made significant efforts to acquire nuclear bombs. Terrorist use of an actual nuclear bomb is a low-probability event—but the immensity of the consequences means that even a small chance is enough to justify an intensive effort to reduce the risk. Fortunately, since the early 1990s, countries around the world have significantly reduced the danger—but it remains very real, and there is more to do to ensure this nightmare never becomes reality. Brighter than a thousand suns. Imagine a crude terrorist nuclear bomb—containing a chunk of highly enriched uranium just under the size of a regulation bowling ball, or a much smaller chunk of plutonium—suddenly detonating inside a delivery van parked in the heart of a major city. Such a terrorist bomb would release as much as 10 kilotons of explosive energy, or the equivalent of 10,000 tons of conventional explosives, a volume of explosives large enough to fill all the cars of a mile-long train. In a millionth of a second, all of that energy would be released inside that small ball of nuclear material, creating temperatures and pressures as high as those at the center of the sun. That furious energy would explode outward, releasing its energy in three main ways: a powerful blast wave; intense heat; and deadly radiation. The ball would expand almost instantly into a fireball the width of four football fields, incinerating essentially everything and everyone within. The heated fireball would rise, sucking in air from below and expanding above, creating the mushroom cloud that has become the symbol of the terror of the nuclear age. The ionized plasma in the fireball would create a localized electromagnetic pulse more powerful than lightning, shorting out communications and electronics nearby—though most would be destroyed by the bomb’s other effects in any case. (Estimates of heat, blast, and radiation effects in this article are drawn primarily from Alex Wellerstein’s “Nukemap,” which itself comes from declassified US government data, such as the 660-page government textbook The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.) At the instant of its detonation, the bomb would also release an intense burst of gamma and neutron radiation which would be lethal for nearly everyone directly exposed within about two-thirds of a mile from the center of the blast. (Those who happened to be shielded by being inside, or having buildings between them and the bomb, would be partly protected—in some cases, reducing their doses by ten times or more.) The nuclear flash from the heat of the fireball would radiate in both visible light and the infrared; it would be “brighter than a thousand suns,” in the words of the title of a book describing the development of nuclear weapons—adapting a phrase from the Hindu epic the Bhagavad-Gita. Anyone who looked directly at the blast would be blinded. The heat from the fireball would ignite fires and horribly burn everyone exposed outside at distances of nearly a mile away. (In the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, visitors gaze in horror at the bones of a human hand embedded in glass melted by the bomb.) No one has burned a city on that scale in the decades since World War II, so it is difficult to predict the full extent of the fire damage that would occur from the explosion of a nuclear bomb in one of today’s cities. Modern glass, steel, and concrete buildings would presumably be less flammable than the wood-and-rice-paper housing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki in the 1940s—but many questions remain, including exactly how thousands of broken gas lines might contribute to fire damage (as they did in Dresden during World War II). On 9/11, the buildings of the World Trade Center proved to be much more vulnerable to fire damage than had been expected. Ultimately, even a crude terrorist nuclear bomb would carry the possibility that the countless fires touched off by the explosion would coalesce into a devastating firestorm, as occurred at Hiroshima. In a firestorm, the rising column of hot air from the massive fire sucks in the air from all around, creating hurricane-force winds; everything flammable and everything alive within the firestorm would be consumed. The fires and the dust from the blast would make it extremely difficult for either rescuers or survivors to see. The explosion would create a powerful blast wave rushing out in every direction. For more than a quarter-mile all around the blast, the pulse of pressure would be over 20 pounds per square inch above atmospheric pressure (known as “overpressure”), destroying or severely damaging even sturdy buildings. The combination of blast, heat, and radiation would kill virtually everyone in this zone. The blast would be accompanied by winds of many hundreds of miles per hour. The damage from the explosion would extend far beyond this inner zone of almost total death. Out to more than half a mile, the blast would be strong enough to collapse most residential buildings and create a serious danger that office buildings would topple over, killing those inside and those in the path of the rubble. (On the other hand, the office towers of a modern city would tend to block the blast wave in some areas, providing partial protection from the blast, as well as from the heat and radiation.) In that zone, almost anything made of wood would be destroyed: Roofs would cave in, windows would shatter, gas lines would rupture. Telephone poles, street lamps, and utility lines would be severely damaged. Many roads would be blocked by mountains of wreckage. In this zone, many people would be killed or injured in building collapses, or trapped under the rubble; many more would be burned, blinded, or injured by flying debris. In many cases, their charred skin would become ragged and fall off in sheets. The effects of the detonation would act in deadly synergy. The smashed materials of buildings broken by the blast would be far easier for the fires to ignite than intact structures. The effects of radiation would make it far more difficult for burned and injured people to recover. The combination of burns, radiation, and physical injuries would cause far more death and suffering than any one of them would alone. The silent killer. The bomb’s immediate effects would be followed by a slow, lingering killer: radioactive fallout. A bomb detonated at ground level would dig a huge crater, hurling tons of earth and debris thousands of feet into the sky. Sucked into the rising fireball, these particles would mix with the radioactive remainders of the bomb, and over the next few hours or days, the debris would rain down for miles downwind. Depending on weather and wind patterns, the fallout could actually be deadlier and make a far larger area unusable than the blast itself. Acute radiation sickness from the initial radiation pulse and the fallout would likely affect tens of thousands of people. Depending on the dose, they might suffer from vomiting, watery diarrhea, fever, sores, loss of hair, and bone marrow depletion. Some would survive; some would die within days; some would take months to die. Cancer rates among the survivors would rise. Women would be more vulnerable than men—children and infants especially so. Much of the radiation from a nuclear blast is short-lived; radiation levels even a few days after the blast would be far below those in the first hours. For those not killed or terribly wounded by the initial explosion, the best advice would be to take shelter in a basement for at least several days. But many would be too terrified to stay. Thousands of panic-stricken people might receive deadly doses of radiation as they fled from their homes. Some of the radiation will be longer-lived; areas most severely affected would have to be abandoned for many years after the attack. The combination of radioactive fallout and the devastation of nearly all life-sustaining infrastructure over a vast area would mean that hundreds of thousands of people would have to evacuate. Ambulances to nowhere. The explosion would also destroy much of the city’s ability to respond. Hospitals would be leveled, doctors and nurses killed and wounded, ambulances destroyed. (In Hiroshima, 42 of 45 hospitals were destroyed or severely damaged, and 270 of 300 doctors were killed.) Resources that survived outside the zone of destruction would be utterly overwhelmed. Hospitals have no ability to cope with tens or hundreds of thousands of terribly burned and injured people all at once; the United States, for example, has 1,760 burn beds in hospitals nationwide, of which a third are available on any given day. And the problem would not be limited to hospitals; firefighters, for example, would have little ability to cope with thousands of fires raging out of control at once. Fire stations and equipment would be destroyed in the affected area, and firemen killed, along with police and other emergency responders. Some of the first responders may become casualties themselves, from radioactive fallout, fire, and collapsing buildings. Over much of the affected area, communications would be destroyed, by both the physical effects and the electromagnetic pulse from the explosion. Better preparation for such a disaster could save thousands of lives—but ultimately, there is no way any city can genuinely be prepared for a catastrophe on such a historic scale, occurring in a flash, with zero warning. Rescue and recovery attempts would be impeded by the destruction of most of the needed personnel and equipment, and by fire, debris, radiation, fear, lack of communications, and the immense scale of the disaster. The US military and the national guard could provide critically important capabilities—but federal plans assume that “no significant federal response” would be available for 24-to-72 hours. Many of those burned and injured would wait in vain for help, food, or water, perhaps for days. The scale of death and suffering. How many would die in such an event, and how many would be terribly wounded, would depend on where and when the bomb was detonated, what the weather conditions were at the time, how successful the response was in helping the wounded survivors, and more. Many estimates of casualties are based on census data, which reflect where people sleep at night; if the attack occurred in the middle of a workday, the numbers of people crowded into the office towers at the heart of many modern cities would be far higher. The daytime population of Manhattan, for example, is roughly twice its nighttime population; in Midtown on a typical workday, there are an estimated 980,000 people per square mile. A 10-kiloton weapon detonated there might well kill half a million people—not counting those who might die of radiation sickness from the fallout. (These effects were analyzed in great detail in the Rand Corporation’s Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack and the British Medical Journal’s “Nuclear terrorism.”) On a typical day, the wind would blow the fallout north, seriously contaminating virtually all of Manhattan above Gramercy Park; people living as far away as Stamford, Connecticut would likely have to evacuate. Seriously injured survivors would greatly outnumber the dead, their suffering magnified by the complete inadequacy of available help. The psychological and social effects—overwhelming sadness, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, myriad forms of anxiety—would be profound and long-lasting. The scenario we have been describing is a groundburst. An airburst—such as might occur, for example, if terrorists put their bomb in a small aircraft they had purchased or rented—would extend the blast and fire effects over a wider area, killing and injuring even larger numbers of people immediately. But an airburst would not have the same lingering effects from fallout as a groundburst, because the rock and dirt would not be sucked up into the fireball and contaminated. The 10-kiloton blast we have been discussing is likely toward the high end of what terrorists could plausibly achieve with a crude, improvised bomb, but even a 1-kiloton blast would be a catastrophic event, having a deadly radius between one-third and one-half that of a 10-kiloton blast. These hundreds of thousands of people would not be mere statistics, but countless individual stories of loss—parents, children, entire families; all religions; rich and poor alike—killed or horribly mutilated. Human suffering and tragedy on this scale does not have to be imagined; it can be remembered through the stories of the survivors of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only times in history when nuclear weapons have been used intentionally against human beings. The pain and suffering caused by those bombings are almost beyond human comprehension; the eloquent testimony of the Hibakusha—the survivors who passed through the atomic fire—should stand as an eternal reminder of the need to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used in anger again. Global economic disaster. The economic impact of such an attack would be enormous. The effects would reverberate for so far and so long that they are difficult to estimate in all their complexity. Hundreds of thousands of people would be too injured or sick to work for weeks or months. Hundreds of thousands more would evacuate to locations far from their jobs. Many places of employment would have to be abandoned because of the radioactive fallout. Insurance companies would reel under the losses; but at the same time, many insurance policies exclude the effects of nuclear attacks—an item insurers considered beyond their ability to cover—so the owners of thousands of buildings would not have the insurance payments needed to cover the cost of fixing them, thousands of companies would go bankrupt, and banks would be left holding an immense number of mortgages that would never be repaid. Consumer and investor confidence would likely be dramatically affected, as worried people slowed their spending. Enormous new homeland security and military investments would be very likely. If the bomb had come in a shipping container, the targeted country—and possibly others—might stop all containers from entering until it could devise a system for ensuring they could never again be used for such a purpose, throwing a wrench into the gears of global trade for an extended period. (And this might well occur even if a shipping container had not been the means of delivery.) Even the far smaller 9/11 attacks are estimated to have caused economic aftershocks costing almost $1 trillion even excluding the multi-trillion-dollar costs of the wars that ensued. The cost of a terrorist nuclear attack in a major city would likely be many times higher. The most severe effects would be local, but the effects of trade disruptions, reduced economic activity, and more would reverberate around the world. Consequently, while some countries may feel that nuclear terrorism is only a concern for the countries most likely to be targeted—such as the United States—in reality it is a threat to everyone, everywhere. In 2005, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that these global effects would push “tens of millions of people into dire poverty,” creating “a second death toll throughout the developing world.” One recent estimate suggested that a nuclear attack in an urban area would cause a global recession, cutting global Gross Domestic Product by some two percent, and pushing an additional 30 million people in the developing world into extreme poverty. Desperate dilemmas. In short, an act of nuclear terrorism could rip the heart out of a major city, and cause ripple effects throughout the world. The government of the country attacked would face desperate decisions: How to help the city attacked? How to prevent further attacks? How to respond or retaliate? Terrorists—either those who committed the attack or others—would probably claim they had more bombs already hidden in other cities (whether they did or not), and threaten to detonate them unless their demands were met. The fear that this might be true could lead people to flee major cities in a large-scale, uncontrolled evacuation. There is very little ability to support the population of major cities in the surrounding countryside. The potential for widespread havoc and economic chaos is very real. If the detonation took place in the capital of the nation attacked, much of the government might be destroyed. A bomb in Washington, D.C., for example, might kill the President, the Vice President, and many of the members of Congress and the Supreme Court. (Having some plausible national leader survive is a key reason why one cabinet member is always elsewhere on the night of the State of the Union address.) Elaborate, classified plans for “continuity of government” have already been drawn up in a number of countries, but the potential for chaos and confusion—if almost all of a country’s top leaders were killed—would still be enormous. Who, for example, could address the public on what the government would do, and what the public should do, to respond? Could anyone honestly assure the public there would be no further attacks? If they did, who would believe them? In the United States, given the practical impossibility of passing major legislation with Congress in ruins and most of its members dead or seriously injured, some have argued for passing legislation in advance giving the government emergency powers to act—and creating procedures, for example, for legitimately replacing most of the House of Representatives. But to date, no such legislative preparations have been made. In what would inevitably be a desperate effort to prevent further attacks, traditional standards of civil liberties might be jettisoned, at least for a time—particularly when people realized that the fuel for the bomb that had done such damage would easily have fit in a suitcase. Old rules limiting search and surveillance could be among the first to go. The government might well impose martial law as it sought to control the situation, hunt for the perpetrators, and find any additional weapons or nuclear materials they might have. Even the far smaller attacks of 9/11 saw the US government authorizing torture of prisoners and mass electronic surveillance. And what standards of international order and law would still hold sway? The country attacked might well lash out militarily at whatever countries it thought might bear a portion of responsibility. (A terrifying description of the kinds of discussions that might occur appeared in Brian Jenkins’ book, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?) With the nuclear threshold already crossed in this scenario—at least by terrorists—it is conceivable that some of the resulting conflicts might escalate to nuclear use. International politics could become more brutish and violent, with powerful states taking unilateral action, by force if necessary, in an effort to ensure their security. After 9/11, the United States led the invasions of two sovereign nations, in wars that have since cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, while plunging a region into chaos. Would the reaction after a far more devastating nuclear attack be any less?

#### Deterrence isn’t credible and causes war.

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In the case of North Korea, one objective of deterrence was to discourage North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, but after Pyongyang crossed that threshold, the question turned into one of compellence: how to compel the regime to relinquish its nuclear weapons while simultaneously deterring it from using those weapons. However, due to the risks involved, to this day no American administration has considered the use of a compellence strategy. Potential risks of compellence include **reputational consequences, undermined credibility, and military escalation.** Opposition by Northeast Asian countries and North Korea’s ability to retaliate would also deter the United States from lodging compellent threats against Pyongyang. Though President Donald J. Trump’s “fire and fury” rhetoric in 2017 resembled compellent threats, they were largely viewed as bluster that **lacked credibility** and pandered to his domestic audience. Nevertheless, Trump’s rhetoric was **dangerous because of the possibility that it could have** **spiraled into inadvertent conflict.** Since the 1990s, the United States has used diplomacy, rather than compellance, as the preferred foreign policy tool to attempt to denuclearize North Korea. From Deterrence to Complexity The United States’ deterrence record is spotty vis-à-vis North Korea, and a judgement of its success or failure hinges on the definition of deterrence’s ultimate target behavior(s) or action(s). **There have been some clear failures** and the jury is still out on whether the United States’ two areas of success—preventing armed conflict and North Korea’s use of a nuclear weapon—will remain successes going forward. Meanwhile, the current summitry to denuclearize the regime could result in success, failure, modest progress, or maintenance of the status quo. The target of U.S. deterrence has evolved and expanded over time with Pyongyang’s development of its military capabilities. After the 1950-1953 Korean War, the objective of deterrence was to discourage North Korea from invading the South again and from engaging in acts of terrorism. The main deterrent against North Korean aggression was (and remains) the U.S.-South Korea alliance, operationalized by the stationing of U.S. troops on and around the peninsula, maintenance of American nuclear weapons on South Korean territory until 1991, provision of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent (or nuclear umbrella) over South Korea, and the conducting of combined defensive military exercises every year. These components constitute a deterrence strategy by providing the capability to impose costs in the event North Korea acts aggressively (e.g., invades or attacks the South), and they demonstrate America’s resolve and political will to act (e.g. threat of retaliation) in the event of North Korean aggression. Deterrence, however, has **failed to prevent Pyongyang from engaging in numerous provocations** (limited, calculated acts of aggression beyond nuclear and missile tests) and acts of terrorism over the past fifty years that have resulted in the deaths of American and South Korean civilians and soldiers.

#### North Korean conflict causes extinction.

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The most recent nuclear state, North Korea, is one of the most troubling in the current group of nuclear states. North Korea is one of the world’s poorest states, facing harsh sanctions and isolation from much of the international community. Yet, despite the hardships, poverty, and poor economy of this autocratic state, it managed to defy the nonproliferation regime and create a fully operational nuclear arsenal.[15] Pyongyang is not bashful about its willingness to use its weaponry either, stating that it will **use its weapons to “reduce the U.S. mainland to ashes and darkness.”**[16] Such a clear security threat may **increase proliferation elsewhere in response.** Allison calls this the “nuclear cascade,” and suggests that **if a state as weak and isolated as North Korea can defy the non-proliferation regime,** **other states are likely to follow suit**.[17] If the United States is incapable of preventing such a clear security threat, **why would Tokyo and Seoul rely on Washington to defend them in the face of a nuclear threat?** Japan already has the capability to build nuclear weapons, possessing well-developed uranium enrichment and missile programs that could allow Japan to rapidly create a credible nuclear weapons program to defend itself and its national interests without the United States. According to The Council on Foreign Relations, there are **thirty states that have the technological ability** to quickly build nuclear weapons.[18] While Pyongyang claims offensive intentions, it is incredibly unlikely to attempt to use its nuclear forces offensively against the United States. Doing so would be an act of suicide, the disparity between U.S. and North Korean forces is far too great. Instead, these weapons were more than likely obtained for defensive purposes. Pyongyang may not be able to destroy the United States, but it can ensure its own sovereignty. Forcibly trying to topple the Kim regime could escalate into the use of nuclear force if Pyongyang got desperate, and a strike designed to eradicate their nuclear weapons would again invoke this “use it or lose it” mentality. While Pyongyang may not be able to destroy the U.S. with its capabilities, it can undeniably cause immense harm to the US. It could cause even greater harm to smaller, closer countries such as U.S. allies Japan and South Korea. Knowledge of this is a strong deterrent against U.S. intervention, allowing Pyongyang to carry on less cautiously without fearing foreign intervention. The creation of this deterrent may have effectively ensured the sovereignty of the Kim regime for the time being, and they are unlikely to relinquish this guarantee. The establishment of this deterrent highlights some of the challenges in the modern nuclear era. North Korea’s outright defiance of the nonproliferation regime sends a signal that other states can build a nuclear capability as well and that such a force may be an effective way to guarantee their sovereignty against the Western world.[19] Proliferation to autocratic states is a **cause for concern**, primarily because they are considerably less stable than democratic states and may be **more willing to utilize a nuclear weapon.** The **inherently volatile nature** of these regimes poses a significant challenge. North Korea has a very poor and impoverished populace, held under authoritarian rule. Regimes such as these are not known for their longevity and stability. The threat of regime change and revolt from within is a realistic consideration with autocratic states. If this occurred, it could result in the loss of a nuclear weapon, or their domestic use to quell a rebellion.[20] It could also **escalate into conflict** as Chinese and U.S. forces both seek to secure their nuclear assets and end up in conflict with each other. China would certainly not accept U.S. forces along the Yalu river, and both would want to immediately seek to ensure the stability of Pyongyang’s nuclear assets.

#### AND coordination failures result in US-China war.

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Second, bureaucratic inertia inclines some U.S. military leaders to regard third-party intervention as a threat to the mission because it may prevent them from conducting the WMD-C3D mission as planned. If the United States insists on securing and destroying North Korean nuclear facilities itself, then China’s presence does endanger that mission. For example, Chinese presence around critical nuclear facilities would complicate any U.S./ROK plans to secure and destroy those facilities themselves, to include conducting standoff attacks.113 Moreover, if Chinese troops and U.S. troops rushed to the same sites, the risk of unintentional clashes would increase dramatically. In short, if the United States fails to adjust its thinking and insists on pushing Chinese troops out of the North Korean nuclear sites, the result could be a war between the United States and China. [End Page 110]

#### Extinction.

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Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-ularmed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

#### Chinese involvement is inevitable---alliance concessions are key to make it effective.

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In short, encouraging China to conduct the WMD-C3D mission, or facilitating its ability to do so, may be beneficial for the U.S./ROK war effort and regional security. Chinese control would lower the likelihood of nuclear use on the peninsula in the short term and, potentially, reduce the economic and military burden to the United States of conducting WMD-C3D in the long term. Additionally, U.S. acceptance of China’s WMD-C3D role would avoid unnecessary clashes between Chinese and U.S. troops that could escalate to full-blown war. [End Page 112]

Conclusion

Given China’s increasing concerns about nuclear security, desire to control refugee flows into China, expanding and improved military capabilities, and geopolitical competition with the United States, China is likely to intervene directly and militarily if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula. Although China’s potential involvement has traditionally been seen as a threat to any U.S. mission under similar circumstances, I argue that the benefits of the Chinese military’s involvement outweigh the costs. The primary objective in a conflict scenario is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea; China has the manpower and capabilities to identify and secure North Korean nuclear facilities effectively and more quickly than the United States. Moreover, in areas of the WMD-C3D mission where China is still potentially weak, such as nonproliferation and the dismantling of nuclear weapons, Beijing has shown a willingness to work with the IAEA and potentially even the United States to meet U.S. standards of success in these areas. Chinese involvement, however, comes at a geopolitical price in that Beijing will demand greater influence on the peninsula at the expense of the United States and its alliance with South Korea.

This research generates a number of recommendations for U.S. policy.122 First, planning to conduct a unilateral U.S. WMD-C3D mission in North Korea may not be a viable option. Evidence suggests that if conflict broke out on the Korean Peninsula, China would take control of some, if not all, of North Korea’s major nuclear facilities. China’s interests are no longer limited to securing its border to prevent an influx of refugees.123 The United States may not get a vote in whether China is involved, and therefore needs to embrace the benefits of Chinese intervention and change its approach to mitigate the associated challenges.

### Solvency---1AC

#### The United States federal government should limit its alliance commitments, including its defense pact, with the Republic of Korea to situations in which the People’s Republic of China has not facilitated the unification of a neutral Korea under the leadership of the Republic of Korea.

#### The plan facilitates a transition---the plan solves coordination wars, rogue nuclear strikes, Chinese growth, and the refugee problem---offering the US alliance is key.

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Unification, however, is not going to happen unless China wants it to, and right now, Beijing does not. For China, unification is a mixed bag. It would solve the nuclear issue as well as the refugee problem posed by desperate North Koreans seeking to escape to or through China, and bring long-term economic benefits from having a more prosperous neighbor than the bankrupt DPRK. However, it comes with two major drawbacks. The first is that if unification is preceded by the outright collapse of North Korea, there could be a contagion effect within China, generating political mobilization against the regime. 2 There are limits to what the United States or South Korea can do to address this fear, but if unification came about in an orderly, negotiated process, it would probably minimize this risk.

The second drawback is China's fear that the United States might do in Korea what it did in Europe after the Cold War. China looks back to German unification and the end of the Cold War, and sees the United States taking advantage of Soviet and later Russian weakness to not only maintain its Cold War alliance, but push it further toward the Russian border. China reasonably expects that the United States will do the same in any scenario involving Korean unification, resulting in U.S. troops on the Yalu River, which China fought the Korean War to prevent. 3 Since China props up North Korea economically and could intervene militarily to block unification in the event of collapse, Beijing exercises an effective veto over moves toward unification; thus to achieve such an outcome, China must believe that it is in its best interest. For unification to move forward, it would almost certainly come with a reduction of the U.S. role on the Korean peninsula, rather than an increase. 4

This raises two questions. First, is there a bargain involving both unification and a reduction of the U.S. role in Korea that the United States, South Korea, and China would prefer to the status quo? Second, if there is such a deal, what are the obstacles to pursuing it and can they be overcome? Relatively little thought has been devoted to these questions. The literature on Korean unification tends to treat it as an exogenous event that lies in the laps of the gods, rather than as a policy outcome that could be brought about through a process of negotiation. 5 As a result, analysis tends to focus on how to prepare for various scenarios by which it may happen, rather than what it might take to bring it about in the first place. 6

In what follows, I first briefly outline why the policy of negotiating with North Korea failed, and why simply waiting for it to collapse is a dangerous alternative, given China's opposition to unification. Next, I outline a potential deal in which China may support unification in exchange for a reduction in the U.S. role in Korea, and discuss why China, South Korea, and the United States could find it attractive. North Korean leaders are unlikely to find it so, but a combination of amnesty and asylum in China could mitigate their opposition. Finally, I discuss how mistrust between the United States and China complicates the picture—and how they can overcome it through a strategy of secret negotiations, multilateral commitments, and a strong role for a unified Korea.

Why Negotiations Failed

The main strategy for dealing with North Korea after the end of the Cold War involved three parts. First, negotiations over the North's nuclear program aimed at freezing or eliminating it by utilizing a package of carrots and sticks; second, normalization of relations with the South, as epitomized by the “sunshine” policy of Kim Dae-jung, attempted to reduce tensions by gradually building economic links with the North (such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex in which southern companies set up plants inside North Korea and employed a northern workforce); third and finally, nations urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to gradually pursue economic and political reform to bring more prosperity to the country.

The negotiations/normalization/reform approach failed to achieve its objectives. North Korea is now a nuclear state and shows no signs of reform or reconciliation with the South. The fundamental problem with the strategy is that North Korea understands that it is unlikely to survive long as a normal state. Therefore, North Korea believes it would be unwise to give up its weapons programs, normalize relations with the South, or reform its economy. Unlike China, Vietnam, and the other post-Cold War communist survivors, North Korea has no potential legitimating ideology other than opposition to the South and nationalist hostility to Japan and the United States. Given that the South Korean economy now towers over the North in a ratio of more than ten to one, 7 North Korea can maintain an anti-Southern stance only so long as it shields its people from knowledge of what life is like there. This precludes normalization of relations, which would entail greater freedom of movement for North and South Koreans and a consequent collapse of the veil of illusions that wraps the North.

In addition, the DPRK correctly perceives that the United States and South Korea would like it to collapse, and that no treaty it could sign will alter that fact. Therefore, the North is unable to make peace with the South or with the outside world more generally; to do so would only serve to commit regime suicide. A corollary is that the North cannot give up its nuclear programs, or even just stop making noise about them. For the North, a steady diet of confrontation with the outside world is a prerequisite for regime survival. The North Korean nuclear weapons program offers the only chance to capture the outside world's attention, while simultaneously fending it off. Giving up its nuclear weapons, normalizing relations with the South, and pursuing economic reforms would therefore endanger the North's survival—and so the policy of negotiating over these issues was doomed to fail from the start.

Why Waiting is Dangerous

The United States and South Korea have largely abandoned negotiations for a policy of waiting and seeing what the future may bring. Unfortunately, if outside actors do nothing, then “what the future may bring” is likely to be more of the same followed by something a good deal worse for all concerned. 8 While both the United States and China cherish incompatible ideal scenarios in which everything goes their way, these are very unlikely to materialize. Instead, the more probable scenarios involve an unplanned regime collapse followed by uncoordinated interventions that could lead to war.

Some U.S. analysts may feel that North Korea is so weak and so clearly destined for the scrap heap of history that all we have to do is wait in order to achieve maximal U.S. goals: a unified Korea ruled from Seoul with no change in its relationship with the United States. 9 This view believes that history will take its course, the North will collapse, the South will absorb the North, and all will be well. The end of the Cold War may seem to validate this view—the eastern European regimes collapsed and were replaced by Western-oriented regimes without the United States having to lift a finger or compensate the Soviet Union. Under such a paradigm, the main questions only involve how to manage the transition phase and who will pay for it. 10 Applying this to the North Korean case, China only enters the analysis as another party to coordinate with in order to avoid any unfortunate misunderstandings in the messy post-collapse environment. 11

The problem with this perspective is that China currently opposes Korean unification and has the will and capabilities to prevent it. 12 For this reason, the post-Cold War analogy is inappropriate here. The eastern European regimes, after all, collapsed because Gorbachev decided to cut them loose. He decided to do so because he believed the Soviet Union could no longer afford to dominate the region, and he no longer even wished to do so for ideational reasons. 13 China feels no such economic constraints, nor is it experiencing an ideological shift toward the West. In fact, a hallmark of Xi Jinping's policy has been to warn against liberalization, Westernization, and the threat of 1989 in which, in Xi's view, Gorbachev's weakness of will led to the collapse of the Soviet sphere of influence and eventually the Soviet Union itself. China's reaction to a sudden collapse of the DPRK will therefore probably look quite different from Gorbachev's.

Indeed, a far more apt analogy than the end of the Cold War would involve two episodes in the middle of it—Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. In both of those cases, Soviet satellite regimes attempted to liberalize, implicitly threatening to cast off their geopolitical shackles and realign with the West. The Soviet Union crushed these efforts with military force and re-imposed obedient client states. The United States confined itself to verbal protests, tacitly conceding that these states fell within the Soviet sphere and would not exit that sphere unless the Soviets permitted.

A contrasting Chinese dream for the future of Korea may be that North Korea gradually reforms its politics and economics while moving closer to China, abandoning its nuclear program and, eventually, any independent foreign policy. China has large investments in North Korea in extractive industries, as well as a large Korean population across the border from the DPRK. An understandable ideal outcome from their perspective would be an obedient buffer state/protectorate that secures the Chinese frontier without all the nuclear drama and human rights headaches caused by the present regime.

This Chinese hope, however, is destined for shipwreck on the rocks of Korean nationalism. As much as China believes that regional peoples look up to them as a big brother, regional peoples have their own national identities and resent Chinese domination. South Korea is unlikely ever to accept a permanent incorporation of the North into China. If the execution of Jang Song-taek—uncle of Kim Jong-un and advocate of the Chinese model in the North Korean leadership—is any evidence, neither will the North Koreans. 14 In fact, the one question on which North and South Korea are in perfect accord is that China's attempt to claim the ancient kingdom of Kogyuro as a Chinese protectorate is an outrageous distortion of history and an insult to all Koreans. 15

If we discount the ideal scenarios of the United States and China as unrealistic, we must face the prospect of more volatile possibilities, particularly those involving unplanned regime collapse and uncoordinated, opposing interventions. Bruce Bennett has recently highlighted the fact that in the event of an unplanned regime collapse, both China and South Korea will face enormous pressures to intervene quickly so as to secure as much territory as possible. 16 If China moves south and the Republic of Korea (ROK) moves north, the result could be a second Korean war, or at best a new armistice on a new Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the interior of North Korea that partitions the north and leaves the ROK extremely dissatisfied. Dialogue between the two sides designed to establish “coordination” or minimize “accidents” is unlikely to be of any use if the two sides pursue opposing strategic objectives—achieving unification (the U.S.–ROK goal) and blocking unification (the Chinese goal). Only if the two sides can agree on a future path for the Korean Peninsula is coordination on the details likely to succeed.

The Outlines of a Deal

What kind of deal could enlist Chinese support for unification at a price tolerable to South Korea and the United States? China would have to withdraw support for the North Korean regime in order to pressure it to join the ROK. To convince the North Korean leadership to leave power, it would be very helpful to offer them asylum in China, permanently protecting them from criminal trials or reprisals. 17 South Korea would have to agree to reunification with the North on the condition that it immediately dismantles the North Korean nuclear program under full international inspections and reaffirms Korea's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state. The United States would have to agree to reduce its role in Korea. It would almost certainly have to withdraw its military forces from united Korea, and possibly scale back or eliminate its alliance relationship as well. Korea could be “neutralized,” much as Austria was early in the Cold War, to remove it from the superpower competition. 18 The key quid pro quo is Chinese termination of support for the North in exchange for U.S. withdrawal from the South.

What would each of the major players have to gain from such a deal? China would reap benefits in at least four areas. First, it would see U.S. troops off the continent of Asia. China views U.S. troops as a threat that is bad enough for now, but would be even worse if Korea unified, with U.S. troops moving north to the Yalu. Second, a deal would eliminate other security threats generated by North Korea, in particular the possibility of war—even nuclear war—on the Korean peninsula. Third, a unified Korea would be an economic dynamo for northern China, contributing to investment and cross-border prosperity. 19 Finally, it would permanently end the refugee problem posed by northern poverty. It's true that there would be a temporary period of instability and migration within Korea and possibly across the Korean–Chinese border, but South Korea would have to take responsibility for this issue and the problem would diminish with time, as it did in the German case.

Two downsides of unification may prove especially salient for China, in addition to the fear of contagion mentioned above. First, the fall of the DPRK would deprive China of a lever against the United States: China may believe that North Korea is useful in the overall relationship with the United States because it poses a threat to the United States that only China can help manage. Once North Korea goes, they may feel, the United States will feel more able to push China harder on other issues such as the territorial disputes with Japan and other Southeast Asian nations.

Second, in losing the DPRK, China would lose its buffer against South Korea. Given how close South Korea is to the United States and Japan, this is a serious consideration. However, geopolitical alignments are not fixed in stone. A unified Korea next to a friendly China would almost certainly grow more distant from the United States and even more so from Japan. 20 Korean–Japanese cooperation is a product of strategic necessity, one that papers over deep animosities resulting from a half century of colonization and war. In that regard, Korea shares much more with China than Japan. An intelligent Chinese policy toward a unified Korea could draw it away from its Cold War friends and toward China, securing China's northeast flank much better than a bankrupt DPRK could.

For South Korea, the key question is whether unification is worth a reduction in ties to the United States to facilitate Chinese acceptance. Unification has not been uncontroversial in South Korean politics. 21 Some South Koreans see North Koreans as increasingly different, and view unification as costly and unnecessary. However, President Park Geun-hye, who took office in February 2013, has embraced a pro-unification platform and an optimistic view of the economic consequences of reunification, emphasizing opportunity rather than costs. 22 South Koreans might prefer unification with U.S. troops to unification without, but given the choice between unification without U.S. troops and continued or perhaps permanent division, a majority would probably support unification.

Turning to the United States, a deal holds at least two major advantages. First, the United States has long stood for peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula under democratic rule from Seoul. The deal would make that goal a reality. Second, analysts across the political spectrum agree that a major security concern facing the United States today is nuclear terrorism. Stopping the proliferation of fissile material production capabilities to states that might use them irresponsibly is a key task in addressing that threat. North Korea, in its quest to survive, might sell related technologies abroad, or even fissile material itself. 23 This would be an extraordinary threat: once fissile material is in the hands of terrorists, they would have overcome the main hurdle to building atomic bombs and destroying U.S. cities.

The price is withdrawing U.S. troops from Korea. Whether this is a high price depends on one's perspective. On the plus side, troops deployed in Korea are not available for other contingencies that might arise in the future in Africa, the Middle East, or elsewhere. In addition, U.S. troops might well have to leave after unification, even if we would prefer that they stay. Korean nationalism has long chafed under the presence of U.S. troops. It is possible that a unified Korea would demand that U.S. troops go home, as the Philippines did after the Cold War. In this case, the concession would have to occur anyway, so the United States may as well make it in advance, when it could purchase something in return.

Opponents to scaling back the U.S. commitment post-unification have focused on alternative missions for the forces involved and on reputational issues. 24 Some in the United States wish to maintain a military presence in Korea after unification in order to hedge against China. In line with the current concern over China's rise, the United States could want military assets in Korea as part of a containment effort to ring China with U.S.-allied bastions that could dam up China's expansionist impulses. (That's precisely why this bargain would be required to get China's assent.) However, it is unclear what military capabilities in Korea could contribute to contingencies where China has initiated territorial disputes, most importantly with respect to Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute with Japan.

Even more salient for some is the reputational argument. In this view, withdrawing troops from Korea as part of a deal with China would send a bad general signal about U.S. resolve to remain a factor in East Asian politics, and might lead some to question the U.S. commitment to Japan or Taiwan. The United States could address this concern by reaffirming these ties, making sure there is no diminution in visible signals of support for our other East Asian allies. 25 In addition, the United States should emphasize that in agreeing to a drawdown in Korea, it does so with South Korean support and in exchange for a very valuable counter-concession from China, the termination of the North Korean regime. There would presumably be no such local support and no such counter-concession on offer in any of the other U.S. alliance commitments to the region, and so no reason to think that the Korean example would generalize. Finally, while policymakers worry a lot about reputation, scholars have found little evidence that reputation matters as much as they think it does. 26 States tend to focus on the capabilities and interests of their opponents, and so long as U.S. interests are clear and its capabilities strong, China is unlikely to misinterpret the Korean case as setting a precedent.

Finally, what about North Korea itself? Pyongyang's leadership would definitely be opposed to any move to unification. However, we should not write off the possibility that they would consent under duress. Given the decay of communist ideology, by this point, the central motivation of the North Korean leadership is probably a mixture of greed and concern for their personal safety. But given the fragility of the regime, they are riding a tiger and need help to dismount. China could meet this need with a guarantee of asylum in China for the top leaders (which should be combined with an amnesty offer from South Korea for lower-level officials who remains in Korea). To the extent that they also wish to save face and appear to have prevailed in their struggle with U.S. imperialism, the deal offers them a semblance of their long-standing goal: eliminating U.S. troops from Korea and achieving unification “by our nation itself,” as the North Koreans like to put it.

A suitable transition could be arranged with a referendum on unification and Korea-wide elections for a new parliament, which would highlight the role of all Koreans in the process. If North Korean leaders prove unmoved by this vision, Chinese economic sanctions would confront them with a downward slope into complete economic collapse. North Korea is dependent on China for energy and food. 27 Hitherto, however dissatisfied China was with North Korean behavior, there were strict limits on how much coercive leverage China could apply because it did not want the regime to collapse. With a negotiated deal in place, this preference would disappear, and the self-imposed limits on China's coercive leverage would disappear along with it. The North could of course threaten war, so the end-game would require delicate handling.

Instead of actively “pulling the plug,” China may prefer a “do not resuscitate” order, which specifies what would happen upon a DPRK collapse without taking active steps to hasten it. This would still be very valuable because it would outline an agreement on how unification should unfold, fix expectations about who does what, and greatly reduce the chance of confrontations and crisis escalation in the interior of the DPRK after a collapse. With such a framework in place, we could then face future provocations from the DPRK with greater equanimity and higher confidence that South Korea, China, and the United States will find a common approach.

As things currently stand, of course China has no interest in pulling the plug. Nor does it have interest in a less coercive “do not resuscitate” agreement, since absent a U.S. concession it prefers the DPRK to survive. If China could be sure of the corresponding U.S. concession, it might reverse this preference—negotiations will be required to see if this is the case. However, in order for any deal to move forward, the United States and China must first address their legacy of mistrust.

#### The plan solves---China will say yes.

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North Korea has been an international headache and human rights disaster for two decades. Deals negotiated in 1994 and 2005 to contain the nuclear problem ultimately collapsed. Recent leadership transitions in both North and South Korea have only worsened relations between the two states.

The main approach for attempting to deal with North Korea has been a combination of negotiations, normalization and reform: first, negotiations over the North’s nuclear program aimed at freezing or eliminating it; second, normalization of relations with the South, as epitomized by the “sunshine” policy of Kim Dae-jung; third, a hope that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) will gradually pursue economic and political reform. The goal is to entice North Korea to give up its nuclear arsenal, make peace with the South and integrate into the international community.

The fundamental problem with the negotiations, normalization and reform approach is that the DPRK is not able to exist as a normal state and therefore cannot give up its weapons programs, normalize relations with the South or reform its society. Unlike China, Vietnam and the other post-Cold War communist non-collapsers, North Korea has no potential legitimating ideology other than opposition to the South. But the South has unambiguously surpassed the North in every way. This precludes normalization of relations, which would entail greater freedom for North Koreans and a consequent collapse of the veil of illusions that wraps the North. North Korea must remain a closed society to survive. A corollary is that the North cannot give up its nuclear programs. For the North, a steady diet of confrontation with the outside world is a prerequisite for regime survival, and the nuclear weapons program provides the best means to both antagonize and deter others.

With the existing approach played out, it’s time to consider alternatives. The obvious candidate is unification. Practically speaking, unification will have to happen by a process of extending the South’s institutions to cover the bankrupt North. The United States has long sought unification on these terms, while China has opposed it. One reason is that the Chinese do not want a U.S. ally hosting U.S. troops sitting on the Chinese border; indeed they fought the Korean war to prevent this. Given that China can apparently support North Korea indefinitely, unification will not happen without Chinese assent, and that assent will not be forthcoming while the U.S. role in Korea remains as it is.

Could China and the United States find a deal involving unification that both would prefer to the status quo? Currently, the United States has troops stationed in South Korea, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is a military ally. As part of a unification deal, the United States could pledge to withdraw its troops, or even end the alliance. A unified Korea could then become a neutral state as far as relations with China are concerned, like Austria during the cold war.

Why might China prefer unification with a lesser role for the United States in Korea over the status quo? China’s interests are threefold. First, it would like to have U.S. troops off the continent of Asia. Viewed from Beijing, U.S. troops in Korea pose an offensive threat to Chinese territory. Second, China wants Japan to remain non-nuclear. Every year that passes in which a nuclear North Korea continues to test nuclear weapons provides another argument for conservatives in Japan that their commitment to non-nuclear status should be reconsidered. Third, China has a general interest in peace and stability on its frontiers, and in economic growth. A unified Korea would provide that stability along with increased trade and other economic benefits. Korea would be an economic dynamo for northern China, contributing to investment and cross-border prosperity. It would also permanently end the refugee problem posed by the DPRK.

Why might the United States prefer unification with a lesser role for itself in Korea to the status quo? One major incentive is the nuclear issue. One thing that Republicans and Democrats agree on is that a major security concern facing the United States today is terrorism with nuclear weapons. Stopping the proliferation of fissile material production capabilities to states that might use them irresponsibly is key to addressing that threat. North Korea, in its quest to survive, might sell related technologies abroad, or even fissile material itself. This would be a grave threat, as once fissile material is in the hands of terrorists, they have overcome the main hurdle in building atomic bombs and destroying American cities.

What about the North Korean leadership? They obviously draw the short straw in any move toward unification. China could make their choice easier by offering them asylum, so that they do not have to personally fear the consequences of losing power. Accompany it by a withdrawal of Chinese support for the Korean economy, and it should be an offer they cannot refuse, at least not for very long.

#### Limiting the MDT is key---counterplans fail.

Doug Bandow 16. Senior fellow at the Cato Institute. "Will China Solve the North Korea Problem? The United States Should Develop a Diplomatic Strategy to Persuade Beijing to Help". Cato Institute. 12-6-2016. https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/will-china-solve-north-korea-problem?utm\_content=bufferc975a&utm\_medium=social&utm\_source=facebook.com&utm\_campaign=buffer

To encourage eventual unification and discourage a Chinese land grab, the United States and the ROK should pledge not to take geopolitical advantage of China — in essence, to guarantee that the PRC would not paradoxically lose the geopolitical chess game by checkmating the North Korean king. That will require allaying Chinese fears of U.S. containment.

So far there have been many proposals for half‐​measures. Secretary Kerry indicated that America could reduce its Pacific presence if the North Korea problem was solved.121 Andrei Lankov, who studied in the North and now teaches in the South, suggested a joint U.S.-South Korean “statement promising that upon unification no U.S. forces and/​or U.S. military installations will ever be located north of the present‐​day DMZ area.“122 Glaser and Billingsley similarly urged a pledge to keep American forces away from the Yalu.

However, such geographic separation would mean little if Korea was reunified. American forces could rapidly move to the Chinese border and beyond in any conflict. Moreover, a shift of South Korea’s military northward could open up additional bases in the South that could back U.S. operations elsewhere in East Asia. The PRC’s concerns may not be assuaged by limited offers.

Washington should make clear its intention to disengage militarily once the Korean problem is solved. The United States should pledge, in the event of reunification, to terminate its mutual defense treaty with Seoul and bring American troops home.123 Voluntarily beginning to withdraw now would help convince Beijing that Washington was serious and could be trusted to fulfill its commitment.

### Extra---1AC

#### Transition away from growth fails.

Buch-Hansen 18 — Hubert Buch-Hansen (Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School), “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy,” Ecological Economics Volume 146, April 2018, Pages 157-163, dml)

Political projects do not become hegemonic just because they embody good ideas. For a project to become hegemonic, (organic) intellectuals first need to develop the project and a constellation of social forces with sufficient power and resources to implement it then needs to find it appealing and struggle for it. In this context, it is worth noting that degrowth, as a social movement, has been gaining momentum for some time, not least in Southern Europe. Countless grassroots' initiatives (e.g., D'Alisa et al., 2013) are the most visible manifestations that degrowth is on the rise. Intellectuals – including founders of ecological economics such as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Herman Daly, and more recently degrowth scholars such as Serge Latouche and Giorgos Kallis – have played a major role in developing and disseminating the ideas underpinning the project. A growing interest in degrowth in academia, as well as well-attended biennial international degrowth conferences, also indicate that an increasing number of people embrace such ideas. Still, the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political parties, labour unions, business associations and international organisations that have so far embraced degrowth is modest to say the least. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are united in the belief that economic growth is necessary and desirable. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis, a pro-growth discourse in other words continues to be hegemonic: it is widely considered a matter of common sense that continued economic growth is required. It is also noteworthy that economic and political elites, to a large extent, continue to support the neoliberal project, even in the face of its evident shortcomings. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a more authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a foregone conclusion that this fraction and the wider coalition behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm unattractive and that such social forces will vehemently oppose the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97). While degrowth advocates envision a future in which market forces play a less prominent role than they do today, degrowth is not an anti-market project. As such, it can attract support from certain types of market actors. In particular, it is worth noting that social enterprises, such as cooperatives (Restakis, 2010), play a major role in the degrowth vision. Such enterprises are defined by being ‘organisations involved at least to some extent in the market, with a clear social, cultural and/or environmental purpose, rooted in and serving primarily the local community and ideally having a local and/or democratic ownership structure’ (Johanisova et al., 2013: 11). Social enterprises currently exist at the margins of a system, in which the dominant type of business entity is profit-oriented, shareholder-owned corporations. The further dissemination of social enterprises, which is crucial to the transitions to degrowth societies, is – in many cases – blocked or delayed as a result of the centrifugal forces of global competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Overall, social enterprises thus (still) constitute a social force with modest power. Ougaard (2016: 467) notes that one of the major dividing lines in the contemporary transnational capitalist class is between capitalists who have a material interest in the carbon-based economy and capitalists who have a material interest in decarbonisation. The latter group, for instance, includes manufacturers of equipment for the production of renewable energy (ibid.: 467). As mentioned above, degrowth advocates have singled out renewable energy as one of the sectors that needs to grow in the future. As such, it seems likely that the owners of national and transnational companies operating in this sector would be more positively inclined towards the degrowth project than would capitalists with a stake in the carbon-based economy. Still, the prospect of the “green sector” emerging as a driving force behind degrowth currently appears meagre. Being under the control of transnational capital (Harris, 2010), such companies generally embrace the “green growth” discourse, which ‘is deeply embedded in neoliberal capitalism’ and indeed serves to adjust this form of capitalism ‘to crises arising from contradictions within itself’ (Wanner, 2015: 23). In addition to support from the social forces engendered by the production process, a political project ‘also needs the political ability to mobilize majorities in parliamentary democracies, and a sufficient measure of at least passive consent’ (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 5–6) if it is to become hegemonic. As mentioned, degrowth enjoys little support in parliaments, and certainly the pro-growth discourse is hegemonic among parties in government.5 With capital accumulation being the most important driving force in capitalist societies, political decision-makers are generally eager to create conditions conducive to production and the accumulation of capital (Lindblom, 1977: 172). Capitalist states and international organisations are thus “programmed” to facilitate capital accumulation, and do as such constitute a strategically selective terrain that works to the disadvantage of the degrowth project. The main advocates of the degrowth project are grassroots, small fractions of left-wing parties and labour unions as well as academics and other citizens who are concerned about social injustice and the environmentally unsustainable nature of societies in the rich parts of the world. The project is thus ideationally driven in the sense that support for it is not so much rooted in the material circumstances or short-term self-interests of specific groups or classes as it is rooted in the conviction that degrowth is necessary if current and future generations across the globe are to be able to lead a good life. While there is no shortage of enthusiasts and creative ideas in the degrowth movement, it has only modest resources compared to other political projects. To put it bluntly, the advocates of degrowth do not possess instruments that enable them to force political decision-makers to listen to – let alone comply with – their views. As such, they are in a weaker position than the labour union movement was in its heyday, and they are in a far weaker position than the owners and managers of large corporations are today (on the structural power of transnational corporations, see Gill and Law, 1989).

6. Consent

It is also safe to say that degrowth enjoys no “passive consent” from the majority of the population. For the time being, degrowth remains unknown to most people. Yet, if it were to become generally known, most people would probably not find the vision of a smaller economic system appealing. This is not just a matter of degrowth being ‘a missile word that backfires’ because it triggers negative feelings in people when they first hear it (Drews and Antal, 2016). It is also a matter of the actual content of the degrowth project. Two issues in particular should be mentioned in this context. First, for many, the anti-capitalist sentiments embodied in the degrowth project will inevitably be a difficult pill to swallow. Today, the vast majority of people find it almost impossible to conceive of a world without capitalism. There is a ‘widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible to even imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (Fisher, 2009: 2). As Jameson (2003) famously observed, it is, in a sense, easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. However, not only is degrowth – like other anti-capitalist projects – up against the challenge that most people consider capitalism the only system that can function; it is also up against the additional challenge that it speaks against economic growth in a world where the desirability of growth is considered common sense. Second, degrowth is incompatible with the lifestyles to which many of us who live in rich countries have become accustomed. Economic growth in the Western world is, to no small extent, premised on the existence of consumer societies and an associated consumer culture most of us find it difficult to completely escape. In this culture, social status, happiness, well-being and identity are linked to consumption (Jackson, 2009). Indeed, it is widely considered a natural right to lead an environmentally unsustainable lifestyle – a lifestyle that includes car ownership, air travel, spacious accommodations, fashionable clothing, an omnivorous diet and all sorts of electronic gadgets. This Western norm of consumption has increasingly been exported to other parts of the world, the result being that never before have so many people taken part in consumption patterns that used to be reserved for elites (Koch, 2012). If degrowth were to be institutionalised, many citizens in the rich countries would have to adapt to a materially lower standard of living. That is, while the basic needs of the global population can be met in a non-growing economy, not all wants and preferences can be fulfilled (Koch et al., 2017). Undoubtedly, many people in the rich countries would experience various limitations on their consumption opportunities as a violent encroachment on their personal freedom. Indeed, whereas many recognize that contemporary consumer societies are environmentally unsustainable, fewer are prepared to actually change their own lifestyles to reverse/address this. At present, then, the degrowth project is in its “deconstructive phase”, i.e., the phase in which its advocates are able to present a powerful critique of the prevailing neoliberal project and point to alternative solutions to crisis. At this stage, not enough support has been mobilised behind the degrowth project for it to be elevated to the phases of “construction” and “consolidation”. It is conceivable that at some point, enough people will become sufficiently discontent with the existing economic system and push for something radically different. Reasons for doing so could be the failure of the system to satisfy human needs and/or its inability to resolve the multidimensional crisis confronting humanity. Yet, various material and ideational path-dependencies currently stand in the way of such a development, particularly in countries with large middle-classes. Even if it were to happen that the majority wanted a break with the current system, it is far from given that a system based on the ideas of degrowth is what they would demand.